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Professional Power and Judicial Review:
The Health Professions*
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN**
It has become almost trite today to speak of a health care "crisis."
For several years commentators of varying disciplines, persuasions,
and degrees of sophistication have been alerting the health professions
and the public to various critical problems associated with the organ-
ization and delivery of health care in America.1 Crisis or not, these
problems undeniably have serious national ramifications and are not
readily solved. Increasingly, commentators are recognizing that the
solutions lie not in remodeling isolated aspects of health care or in
lubricating the system's gears, but in substantially restructuring the
entire health care system.
2
* This article is an outgrowth of a paper that the author prepared for the
Study of Accreditation of Selected Health Education Programs (SASHEP), a
project co-sponsored by the American Medical Association, the Association of
Schools of Allied Health Professions, and the National Commission on Accred-
iting. The project was funded by the Commonwealth Fund and undertaken
by an independent study commission. The views herein are the author's and
not necessarily those of SASHEP. For the SASHEP Commission's final report
see SASHEP, CoMMIssIoN REPORT (Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting 1972).
** Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University. A.B., Univ. of Roch-
ester, 1964; J.D., Cornell Univ., 1967.
1. See, e.g., S. KLAW, THE GREAT AMERICAN MEDIcnEz SHOW (1975). See
Symposium-Health Care (pts. 1 & 2), 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 229, 667
(1970), for a collection of sophisticated views of commentators from law, so-
ciology, economics, public health, and medicine.
2. See, e.g., COMMITTEE FOR EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT, BUILDING A NATIONAL
HEALTH-CARE SYSTEM (1973). For a framework for a systems analysis of
health care, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, TowARDS A SYS-
TEMATIc ANALYSIS OF HEALTH CAE IN THE UNITED STATES (1972). Restructur-
ing does not imply complete disavowal of the present system. As one com-
mentator has noted:
[I]t is the height of fancy to believe that we can prescribe entirely
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The role of the health professions themselves and their interlocking
national, state, and local professional associations is a focal point of
the ongoing debate. Through a variety of direct and indirect standard-
setting mechanisms, these associations exert great influence in their
professions. The health professional associations have controlled,
almost exclusively, entry to the professions, definition of professional
functions, and award of professional recognition and benefits, such as
specialty certification or hospital privileges. They have, moreover,
set the standards for measuring the capacity and performance of all
the health care system's participants-the dentists, optometrists, and
physicians, the nurses, the pharmacists, the allied health professionals,
the professional schools and health education programs, and the hos-
pitals, laboratories, and clinics.
Standard-setting in health care, being the province of the health
professions, has been relatively isolated from public scrutiny and the
demands of the "public interest."3 As the health care delivery system
grows in size and complexity, it increasingly affects societal interests
and becomes, therefore, a subject of public policy. The recent wave of
public concern about health care has precipitated a trend toward
public scrutiny of professional standards. This trend has created a
tension in the system which is prompting a redefinition of the role
of professionalism within the health care system, as well as a rethink-
ing of governmental and public roles in the system's operation.
Courts and legislatures, the ultimate propounders of public policy,
4
can play a crucial role in this redefinition and rethinking. As policy
makers and interest groups have sought firmer handholds on the
professionally dominated standard-setting processes, the demands on
courts and legislatures to scrutinize the system have escalated. Re-
new models of delivering health services that will replace the existing
system .... [T]he future pattern of health services in the United
States will be largely woven out of already existing elements and tra-
ditions.
Mechanic, Problems in the Future Organization of Medical Practice, 35 LAW
& CONrsMn. PROB. 233, 251 (1970).
3. As used in this article, "public interest" means the community of societal
interests held by the general public which may merge with, but tends to tran-
scend, the professional, economic, and personal interests of health profession-
als, professional associations, or other private individuals or groups in society.
See J. MILLER, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NONGOVERNMaENTAL POSTSECOND-
ARY ACCREDITATION: RELATIONSHIP TO USES OF ACCREDITATION 7, 109, 120-21
(Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting 1973).
4. "Public policy is the cornerstone-the foundation-of all Constitutions,
statutes, and judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and
its depth, greater than any or all of them." Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 69, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916). As the legislator and
the judge formulate public policy, "the choice of methods, the appraisement
of values, must in the end be guided by like consideration for the one as for
the other. Each is indeed legislating within the limits of his competence." B.
CARwozo, THE NATURE OF TE JUDICIAL PROCESS 114 (1921). As used in this
article, "public policy" is assumed to be policy formulated in pursuit of the
public interest. See note 3-supra.
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sponding to these demands, courts and legislatures are beginning to
reshape -the relationship of the law to the health care system. This
article examines the reshaping process and suggests directions for
future development in one crucial area of concern: The role of the
judiciary in reviewing exercises of power by health professional
associations, particularly with respect to their standard-setting func-
tions.
Professional Power and the Standard-Setting
Role of the Health Professions
A great variety of professional associations participate in the process
of setting standards for the health care system. Most powerful among
them is the American Medical Association, about which it has been
said:
No other voluntary association commands such power within its
area of interest as does the AMA. It holds a position of authority
over the individual doctor, wields a determining voice in medical
education, controls the conditions of practice, and occupies a
unique position of influence in shaping government health pol-
icies.5
Many other professional associations increasingly share standard-
setting responsibility with the AMA and the state and local medical
societies affiliated with the AMA. Medical specialty boards and asso-
ciations, such as the American Society of Clinical Pathologists, greatly
influence the medical specialties. 6 In their respective domains, the
American Dental Association, the American Optometric Association,
the American Osteopathic Association, and the American Podiatry
Association assume roles similar to the AMA for other groups of
primary care providers. Professions not providing primary care are
represented by comparable groups, such as the American Dietetic
Association, the American Pharmaceutical Association, -the American
Psychological Association, and the American Public Health Associa-
tion. In nursing, both the American Nurses' Association and the
National League for Nursing exert an important influence. In each
of the numerous, rapidly expanding allied health professions and
paraprofessions, such as physical therapy, some professional associ-
ations such as the American Physical Therapy Association, seek con-
trol over the occupation.1
5. Comment, The American Medical Association: Power, Purpose, and
Politics in Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937, 1018 (1954). See generally
E. RAYACK, PROFESSIONAL POWER AND AmVERIcAN IEDicn: THE EcoNoiviics OF
THE AavrEcIcAN MEDIcAL AssocIATIoN (1967). In recent years, the AMTA has de-
clined in membership and influence within some segments of the medical pro-
fession, while other organizations, particularly the medical specialty boards
and associations, have grown. Auerbach, New Doctor Units Challenge AMA
for Members, Influence, The Washington Post, July 1, 1973, at A18, col. 1.
6. See R. STEVENS, Aiv cAN MDicINE mN THE PuBLIc INTEREST 75-347
(1971).
7. See VL PENNELL, J. PROP=rT' & T. HATcH, AccREITATIoN AND CERTIFIcA-
TION IN RELATION TO ALLIED HEALTH MANPOWER 1-2, 5-6 (1971). See Selden,
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Associations also represent health care institutions. Notably, the
American Hospital Association and the Association of American Medi-
cal Colleges increasingly have become involved in standard-setting
as medical schools and hospitals, particularly teaching hospitals, have
become central to the modern health care system.8 These institutional
associations often cooperate to establish yet another layer of standard-
setting organizations, such as the Liaison Committee on Medical Edu-
cation and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
Certain health professional associations operating on the state and
substate level also perform standard-setting functions. Within indi-
vidual hospitals, organized medical staffs, each a small scale profes-
sional association, engage in standard-setting.9 Professional Standards
Review Organizations (PSRO's), required by the 1972 amendments
to the Social Security Act, are assuming standard-setting and review
responsibility over the professional activities of both practitioners
and hospitals. 1°
Despite the number and diversity of the health professional associ-
ations, their standard-setting is often interrelated. For instance,
membership selection is crucial to a health professional not merely
because of the adverse implications concerning fitness that inhere in
exclusion or expulsion, but because membership may be a condition
of obtaining other forms of professional status. National, state, or
local society membership, for example, may be a condition of eligi-
bility for hospital staff privileges,i' membership in another associa-
Expansion in Accreditation of Health Educational Programs, in SASHEP,
STAFF WoRnG PAPERs pt. I (Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting 1971), for a general
discussion on expansion in the health professions.
8. See HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY CENTER, THE AAMRuCAN HEALTH EMPIRE:
PowER, PRoFITs, AND PoLICs 29-39 (1970).
9. See M. ROEMER & J. FRIEDMAN, DOCTORS IN HosPITALs 1-48 (1971); THE
MEDIcAL STAFF in THE MODERN HosprrAL (C. Wesley Eisele ed. 1967).
10. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. 92-603, § 249 F, 86 Stat. 1429, amending, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1301-20 (1970), as amended (Supp. V, 1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1301, 1320b-1320c-19 (Supp. V, 19755). The purpose of the legislation is "to
assure, through the application of suitable procedures of professional standards
review, that the services for which payment may be made under [the Social
Security Act] will conform to appropriate professional standards for the pro-
vision of health care .... ." Social Security Act § 1151, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c
(Supp. V, 1975). The Secretary of HEW establishes a jurisdictional area for
each PSRO, see 39 Fed. Reg. 10204 (1974), and designates the organization to
perform review functions within that area. Social Security Act § 1152, 42
U.S.C. § 1320c-1 (Supp. V, 1975). Preference in designation must be given
professional associations of physicians that meet the statute's eligibility re-
quirements. Social Security Act § 1152(b),(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1(b),(c)
(Supp. V, 1975). See generally Symposium-Professional Standards Review
Organizations, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 355; Note, Federally Imposed Self-Regulation
of Medical Practice: A Critique of the Professional Standards Review Organi-
zation, 42 GEo. WAsiL L. REV. 822 (1974).
11. See Maricopa Medical Soc'y v. Blende, 104 Ariz. 12, 448 P.2d 68 (1968).
Staff privileges are themselves a type of membership status operating as a
standard-setting mechanism. As with other membership mechanisms, the
grant of privileges may be a prerequisite to other professional status. Under
the PSRO legislation, for example, only doctors "having active hospital staff
1976]
tion, 12 permission to hold oneself out as a specialist,13 or certification
or registration in a medical or allied health specialty.
14
Certification and registration of individual professionals are other
standard-setting devices. 15 Board certification or eligibility may be a
prerequisite for hospital privileges' 6 and, in some allied health pro-
fessions, may be required for membership in the professional associ-
ation.' 7 Some accrediting agencies use certification and registration
to evaluate the personnel and staffing arrangements of educational or
health service agencies applying for accreditation.' s The federal gov-
ernment may require certification or registration for job eligibility
and mobility,' 9 or for appointment to selected staff positions in hos-
pitals and laboratories participating in Medicare.20  States sometimes




Yet another standard-setting device, accreditation, focuses upon
programs and institutions rather than upon individuals. 22  Hospital
accreditation, among other things, provides a basis for the certifica-
tion of hospitals as Medicare providers.23 For a practitioner, gradua-
tion from an accredited program of study is often a prerequisite for
certification or registration,24 membership in a professional associa-
tion,25 and licensure itself.
26
Licensure, the last major standard-setting device, differs from the
other devices because it is government sponsored.2 7  Despite public
privileges in at least one of the participating hospitals in the area served" by
the PSRO may be assigned responsibility for reviewing hospital care. Social
Security Act § 1155 (a) (5), 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-4 (a) (5) (Supp. V, 1975).
12. See Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289,
46 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810-11 nn. 2-3 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
13. Id. at 815-16.
14. Grimm, The Relationship of Accreditation to Voluntary Certification and
State Licensure, in SASHEP, supra note 7, pt. II, at 1-6 to I-7, app. table 4.
15. "Certification" is the process by which a nongovernmental agency or as-
sociation grants recognition to an individual who has met certain predeter-
mined qualifications specified by the agency or association. "Registration" is
the process by which qualified individuals are listed on an official roster main-
tained by a governmental or nongovernmental agency. These definitions, as
well as those in notes 22 and 27 infra, are taken from SASHEP, CoMMIssIoN
REPORT (Nat'l Comm'n on Accrediting 1972).
16. RAYACK, supra note 5, at 211-13; Comment, supra note 5, at 952-53.
17. PENNELL, PRorFTr & HATcH, supra note 7, at 7.
18. Grimm, supra note 14, at 1-3, 1-8.
19. Id. at 1-3.
20. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1038(b), .1040(a), (c) (1), .1311(b), .1314(b)
(1976).
21. M. PENNELL & P. STEWART, STATE LICENSING OF HEALTH OCCUPATIONS
19, 32-33, 107, 133, 140, 143 (1968).
22. "Accreditation" is the process by which an agency or association evalu-
ates and recognizes a program of study or an institution as meeting certain
predetermined qualifications or standards. In the health care system, accred-
itation of professional schools, health education programs, intern and residency
programs, hospitals, and laboratories is conducted primarily by nongovern-
mental organizations.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(e), 1395bb (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
24. See Grimm, supra note 14, at 1-4 to 1-7 and app. table 4.
25. See PENNELL, PROFFIr= & HATCH, supra note 7.
26. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, LICENsURE AND RELATED
HEALTH PERSONNEL CREDENTIALING 8, 25, 27 (1971).
27. "Licensure" is the process by which a government agency grants permis-
sion either to individuals meeting predetermined qualifications to engage in
a given occupation and use a particular title or to institutions, such as hospi-
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sponsorship, however, licensure is still controlled, at least indirectly,
by the private professional associations. State licensing boards are
usually composed of members of the pertinent professions and often
are chosen from nominee lists submitted by the state professional
society.28 Membership in the state society may be a prerequisite for
membership on the state licensing board.29 State boards generally
rely upon -the accreditation standards of the national professional
associations in determining eligibility of graduates to take the licen-
sure exam and in otherwise measuring the educational qualifications
of licensure applicants.30
Clearly, these interlocking standard-setting devices greatly influence
the operation of the health care system. Through these devices, pro-
fessional associations control access to the system at every critical
point, enabling the associations to govern quality and quantity and
to particularize the functions of health manpower. Similarly, the
professional associations employ standard-setting devices to control
the education and training of members and prospective members of
the health professions. Since quality of care, manpower shortages,
and educational reform are primary subjects of concern in the cur-
rent health care debate,31 increased public scrutiny of the standard-
setting power of health professional associations is appropriate.
Courts can be expected to participate in this increased scrutiny.
Each time a health care professional runs afoul of the standard-
setting process, the potential for litigation exists. The physician
whose local medical society membership is revoked, the allied health
professional who is rejected for certification, the professional school
or hospital whose accreditation is denied are all potential plaintiffs.
tals, to perform specified functions. See generally Forgotson, Roemer & New-
man, Legal Regulation of Health Personnel in the United States, in 2 REPORT
OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY Comn'N OF HEALTH MANPOWER 279 (1967).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 26, at 2, 23-
24, 29-30.
29. In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the Alabama Board of Op-
tometry charged the plaintiffs, licensed optometrists, with unethical practices
for working as salaried employees rather than as independent practitioners.
In seeking to enjoin the Board's delicensing proceedings against them, the
plaintiffs noted that "only members of the Alabama Optometric Association
could be members of the Board, and ... the Association excluded from mem-
bership optometrists such as the plaintiffs who were employed by other per-
sons or entities. The result was that 92 of the 192 practicing optometrists in
Alabama were denied participation in the governance of their own profession."
Id. at 571. The Court held that the Board, as constituted, could not constitu-
tionally adjudicate the charges lodged against plaintiffs. Id. at 579.
30. Grimm, supra note 14, at 1-12 to 1-15. This practice was upheld by the
courts as long ago as 1922 in Jones v. State Bd. of Medical Registration, 111
Kan. 813, 208 P. 639 (1922). But see Duson v. Poage, 318 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) (government agency may not prospectively bind itself to all
changes in association's standards).
31. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION
AND THE NATION'S HEALTH (1970); R. MCCLEERY, L. KEELTY, M. LAm, R. PHIL-
Lips & T. Qunm, ONE LIFE-ONE PHYSICIAN (1971).
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Conversely, litigation may arise when a professional succeeds in the
standard-setting process, but other professionals disagree with the
professional association's decision, such as when a hospital staff mem-
ber contests the staff's refusal to withdraw another member's priv-
ileges. Consumers of health services are also potential plaintiffs in
litigation concerning standards. A patient, for example, may contest
a professional association policy that allegedly restrains professional
practice.
Considerations Influencing Judicial Review of
Professional Association Activity
American courts, following their British predecessors, historically have
been reluctant to review affairs of private associations. Sometimes
courts have refused to hear cases by invoking the exhaustion of rem-
edies doctrine;32 at other times, they have simply held judicial review
to be inappropriate. In recent years this reluctance has decreased,
particularly with regard to professional associations,"3 although courts
have varied in their willingness to intervene in the affairs of private
associations. When and why a particular court will hear an associa-
tional dispute is often difficult to determine because courts have often
inadequately articulated the reasons influencing them to take juris-
diction. A need exists for clarifying the reasons and underlying
policy considerations that should govern judicial intrusion into areas
dominated by professional power.
When asked to review an action of a private association, the courts
should consider that action in the context of the association's particu-
lar functions in society.34 The courts must distinguish between
32. See, e.g., Gashgai v. Maine Medical Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571, 575-77 (Me.
1976), in which the court considered but rejected the defendant's exhaustion
argument. Under the exhaustion doctrine, an aggrieved party must exhaust
all internal remedies which the association makes available to him, assuming
resort to such remedies would not be futile and could provide proper redress,
before seeking review in the courts. See generally Developments in the Law
-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 983,
1069-80 (1963). Although the exhaustion doctrine has generally been applied
only to association members, its use arguably should depend upon the issues
raised in the dispute rather than the membership status of the complainant.
Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies in Private, Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE
L.J. 369, 386-87 (1956).
33. See Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162
A.2d 324 (1960), aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
34. Particularly in the professions, each association
. . plays a . . . role in our society, and the legal content of the rela-
tionships involved is molded in part by the nature of that role, by the
appropriateness of particular actions and policies to that role, and by
the reasonable expectations of the public and the individuals affected.
Such factors are neither abstractly determined nor static in nature but
are derived from examination of the life and dynamics of the organi-
zation itself and from its own definition of its role expressed through
its rules and customs.
Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1247, 1262-63 (1967). See also Falcone
v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960),
aff'd, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), in which the court advocated "distin-
guish[ing] between the various types of organizations and the effect on pub-
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professional associations and other organizations, such as social clubs,
religious societies, and fraternal associations, which have entirely
different relationships to society.2 5 In addition, the courts must dif-
ferentiate among professional associations according to each associa-
tion's purposes, expectations, and impact on society.8 6 Principles tak-
ing such differentiations into account must be devised to guide judicial
review of professional associations."' These principles should embrace
four considerations: The association's need for autonomy, the exper-
tise of the association, the public interest in the functions of the asso-
ciation and the profession it represents, and the potential harm that
the association's actions can inflict on a member or prospective mem-
ber of the association or the public. The greater the association's
expertise and need for autonomy, the less likely should judicial
intervention be. The greater the public interest in an association's
activities and the harm the association can cause, the more likely
should judicial intervention be.
Autonomy
Private associations' desire and need for autonomy are probably the
chief reason for the judiciary's traditional reluctance to review associ-
ation activities. Autonomy was to be protected because:
The health of society will usually be promoted if the groups
within it which serve the industrial, mental, and spiritual needs
lic policy of a specific act of a specific organization." Id. at 195-96, 162 A.2d at
330.
35. One court made this distinction as follows:
When courts originally declined to scrutinize admission practices of
membership associations they were dealing with social clubs, religious
organizations and fraternal associations. Here the policies against ju-
dicial intervention were strong and there were no countervailing poli-
cies. When courts were later called upon to deal with trade and pro-
fessional associations exercising virtually monopolistic control, differ-
ent factors were involved. The intimate personal relationships which
pervaded the social, religious and fraternal organizations were hardly
in evidence and the individual's opportunity of earning a livelihood
and serving society in his chosen trade or profession appeared as the
controlling policy consideration.
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical, Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 596, 170 A.2d 791, 799
(1961).
36. Such a functional approach, emphasizing the relationships among the
organization, the individuals with whom it deals, and the society in which it
operates, is by no means new to the common law. The common law has often
focused upon function and status concepts, as in the law of master-servant,
bailor-bailee, or parent-child. Although contract concepts often replaced
status concepts as the common law developed, contract principles cannot suffi-
ciently protect individuals in modem organized society, who must confront
private power concentrations with which they cannot effectively bargain.
Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 34, at 1251-56. Thus "the common law responds
in part to the challenges of organized society by reformulating common law
principles to impose duties and obligations on the basis of status or relation-
ship... ." Id. at 1248-49. For a discussion of professionalism's evolution from
status concepts to contract concepts and back to status, see J. LIEBERMAN,
TYRANNY OF THE ExPERTs ch. 3 (1970).
37. See Edel, Commentary: Shared Commitment and the Legal Principle,
19763
of citizens are genuinely alive. Like individuals, they will usually
do most for the community if they are free to determine their
own lives for the present and the future . . . . Legal supervision
must often be withheld for fear that it may do more harm than
good.38
This belief in the need for autonomy for professional associations is
an outgrowth of the theory of pluralism, which maintains that social
value inheres in the existence of many and diverse private associa-
tions operating within society. Such a pattern of social and political
organization presumably stimulates voluntarism and dynamism with-
in society and diffuses power by enabling private centers of influence
to operate independently of the state. The result is an open and
elastic society which promotes individual freedom by providing a
receptive social and political structure.39 Such a pluralistic society,
in turn, presupposes a system of private associations representing
various interest groups within limited spheres of operation, whose
competing interests are balanced and adjusted by the state.
Professional associations are private power centers and interest
groups for the professions they represent. The role of these associa-
tions, therefore, conforms with the pluralistic concept of society and
supports the association's claim to the autonomy of pluralism. Pro-
fessional associations, unlike other types of private associations, can
also assert economic laissez-faire as a second foundation for autonomy.
Comprehensive professional autonomy "constitutes the kind of entre-
preneurial position that nineteenth-century Western Liberal notions
of 'freedom' readily embrace.
' '40
The professions have historically attempted to expand their auton-
omy, often with government as an ally. Complete professional auton-
omy has come to mean that the profession determines its own
standards for the education and training of members and prospective
members; is recognized through a system of governmental licensure,
control over which the government delegates largely to the profession
itself; shapes the legislation which affects it; and is free from lay
evaluation and control. 41 Of all professions, the health professions,
particularly dentistry and medicine, have probably most closely
approached complete autonomy. Not only are the dental and medical
professions protected by a comprehensive system of licensure granting
them effective professional monopolies in their respective areas of
in VOLUNTARY AsoOCIlTIONs 31-34 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS].
38. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L.
REV. 993, 1027 (1930).
39. See Chapman, Voluntary Associations and the Political Theory of Plu-
ralism, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 37, at 87-93.
40. E. FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF Ap-
PLIED KNOWLEDGE 44 (1970). For a discussion of the ill effects of laissez-faire
in the medical profession, see R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1971).
41. Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging Profession:
Psychology, Medicine, Sociology, 25 Am. Soc. REV. 902, 903 (1960). See gen-
erally E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
MEDICAL CARE (1970).
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operation, but they also have developed comprehensive systems of
accreditation, certification, and registration that, in conjunction with
licensure, assure -them control over standards for education and
training. In the legislature arena, the dental and medical professions
have been strong pressure groups, and since the basis of dentistry and
medicine is a core of esoteric scientific knowledge familiar only to
each profession's members, lay evaluation has been almost nonexistent.
Autonomy in the health professions is a highly organized group
autonomy which seeks to protect the autonomy of individual mem-
bers by using interlocking professional associations to represent the
professions in their relations with government and the public.
Although this autonomy has served to shield health professional asso-
ciations from public scrutiny in the past, limitations on the societal
value of organized autonomy are increasingly apparent. Some limita-
tions are inherent in the concept of autonomy; by its own terms,
autonomy loses value whenever its exercise distorts the division of
private and public power envisioned in a pluralistic society. Other
limitations on the value of autonomy are evident in countervailing
societal interests to be discussed below, such as the public interest in
health care and the avoidance of individual and social harm.
Insofar as it is supportive of pluralism, autonomy is intended to
promote the privateness and voluntariness of group action and to
enable groups to form associations as buffers against centralized
governmental power in particular areas of interest. The law that has
developed concerning such associations is called the law of voluntary,
private associations. 42 Yet, most professional associations today, par-
ticularly in the dental and medical professions, are no longer truly
voluntary or truly private.43 Because of the interdependence of pro-
fessional associations and the government's reliance on their standard-
setting and self-regulation, membership and good standing in one or
more associations may be a matter of necessity rather than of voluntary
choice.44 The government's reliance on professional associations and
delegation of power to them, moreover, blurs the line between public
and private activity. Goals that once -may have been accomplished
through independence from government may now be accomplished
through cooperation with government; activities once private may
now be "quasi-public." Especially in the professions, private associ-
42. See, e.g., 7 C.J.S. Associations § 1 (1937); 6 Am. JuR. Associations and
Clubs §§ 1-3 (1963).
43. See generally VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 36, at viii-ix. With
regard to professional accrediting activities, see Comment, The Legal Status
of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problems in Judicial Supervision
and Governmental Regulation, 52 CORNELL L. REv. 104, 114 (1966).
44. See Hurst, Commentary: Constitutional Ideals and Private Associa-
tions, in VOLmTARY AssocIATIoNs, supra note 37, at 64.
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ation may connote not privateness, but a "hidden hierachy" of inter-
locking public and private concerns 45
When the voluntarism and privateness of professional associations
decline, the societal value of their autonomy must be reevaluated.4 6
Neither courts nor the rest of society can ignore these changed cir-
cumstances when determining the extent to which professional auton-
omy should limit the judiciary's role in solving professional power
disputes.
Expertise
The health professions' assertion of autonomy is premised, in part,
upon their possession of an expertise which they allege transcends
the competence and perhaps even the comprehension of nonprofes-
sionals. To nurture and apply this expertise for society's benefit,
the professions contend that they must be free from intervention by
government and private interests not possessing the requisite exper-
tise. In short, to operate expertly, the professions must operate
autonomously. Undoubtedly there is merit in this argument. Through
professional schools and research programs, the health professions
perpetuate and develop a body of knowledge vital to society. If this
knowledge is to be used in society's best interests, professional stand-
ards must guide its application. In the health care area, where pro-
fessional action is so dependent upon esoteric scientific knowledge
and can so vitally affect individuals, a high level of expertise is
required in standard-setting. Only those trained and experienced in
the health professions themselves have this necessary special com-
petence.
The courts have respected the professional expertise of health pro-
fessions and the high degree of public esteem accorded them. "[T] he
court must guard against unduly interfering with [a health profes-
sional association's] autonomy by substituting judicial judgment for
that of the . . . association in an area where the competence of the
court does not equal that of the [association]." 4  When reviewing
professional affairs, however, the courts should not end their inquiry
with the determination that the association possesses a special com-
petence. The degree of judicial deference accorded professional ex-
pertise should depend upon two other considerations: Whether the
association was applying its expertise in taking the challenged action,
and whether the association's expertise is competent to satisfactorily
resolve the matter in dispute.
Decisions of professional associations can be based on considerations
other than expertise, although the claim of expertise may be used to
45. C. GILB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: T!I PROFESSIONS Am GovERNiENT (1966).
See generally Harris, Voluntary Association as a Rational Ideal, in VoLmqTARY
AssocrATioNs, supra note 37 at 50-53, 59.
46. See Daniels, How Free Should Professions Be? in TmI PROFESSIONS AM
THEIR PROSPECTS 39, 50-56 (E. Freidson ed. 1973).
47. Blende v. M-aricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 245, 393 P.2d
926, 930 (1964).
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mask other considerations influencing decisionmaking. Receptivity
to considerations other than expertise is inherent in the character of
professional associations, which typically represent not only broad
public interest, but the narrower interests of their own members. 48
Since these two sets of concerns do not always coincide,49 a potential
conflict of interests arises. 50 Thus, when considerations other than
expertise influence professional action, the association may be acting
more as a professional "union" for its members than as a protector of
societal interests. Only when the professional association in fact
relies upon its expertise is it genuinely pursuing its standard-setting
function and likely to be operating in the public interest.
The courts must differentiate situations where expertise predom-
inates from those where it does not and defer to professional judgment
only where expertise is predominant. A few courts have made this
distinction. In Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society,5 1 a
local medical society denied membership to a licensed physician
because he had graduated from a school of osteopathy which, though
providing a full medical curriculum, was not recognized by the AMA.
Determining that the society's action was "arbitrary and unreason-
able," the court remarked:
When the County Society engages in action which is designed to
advance medical science or elevate professional standards, it
should and will be sympathetically supported. When, however,
as here, its action has no relation to the advancement of medical
science or the elevation of professional standards but runs strongly
48. HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY CENTER, supra note 8, at 21-24; FREISON, supra
note 40, at 361-68; Hurst, supra note 44, at 66-67.
49. The example most often discussed is probably the doctor shortage: the
profession's economic interests in limiting the number of physicians and in cir-
cumscribing permissible forms of doctor-patient relationships allegedly con-
flicts with society's interest in an adequate medical manpower pool. See, e.g.,
IRYACK, supra note 5, at 72-78, 81-98; Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of
Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEVP. PROB. 267 (1970). For a recent case presenting
a similar conflict situation, see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); see
note 29 supra and accompanying text.
50. On the one hand, the maintenance of professionally established qual-
ity standards is generally accepted as a socially desirable function of
professional organizations; this is particularly true of medical care,
where the quality of services provided may mean the difference be-
tween life and death. On the other hand, the professional organiza-
tion is inevitably concerned with protecting and advancing the eco-
nomic interests of its members. Since it is inherently difficult to
translate "quality" into objectively quantifiable terms, there arises the
possibility of an internal contradiction in the dual role of the profes-
sional organization as protector of society's welfare through the regu-
lation of quality and as defender of the economic interests of the mem-
bers of the organization.
RAYACK, supra note 5, at xiv.
51. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), aff'g 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324
(1960).
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counter to the public policy of our State and the true interests of
justice, it should and will be stricken down.
52
Similarly, in Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, a hospital denied staff
membership to a licensed physician who had graduated from the
same osteopathic school as Dr. Falcone, invoking a bylaw requiring
staff members to be graduates of schools approved by the AMA and
to be members of the local medical society. 53 In overturning the
hospital's decision, the court noted that the denial of membership was
not because of any lack of individual merit, but for a reason "unre-
lated to sound hospital standards .... -54
The conclusions of the courts in Falcone and Greisman presuppose
judicial awareness of the appropriate boundaries of expertise. To
determine whether a professional association is applying its expertise
in undertaking a certain course of action, the courts must define that
profession's expertise and mark its limits carefully.55 Although
courts have seldom raised such questions, they may be expected to do
so increasingly as social scientists advance the state of the art.5 6
To confine expertise to areas where is should predominate over lay
opinion, the courts must distinguish true expertise from the "social
and political power of the expert. '57 In terms of a particular pro-
fession's work, this requires a separation of the technical content of
the work from its "nontechnical zones," such as working conditions,
resources, and relationships with colleagues. 58 The technical content
of the work requires the direct application of expertise; the nontech-
nical zones require expertise only indirectly or not at all.
For the health professions, the technical content of work centers on
52. Id. at 598, 170 A.2d at 800. To support its proposition that the society
had not relied on its expertise, the court noted:
[T]he record establishes that Dr. Falcone received a full medical
course along with the degree of D.O. at the Philadelphia School, re-
ceived the degree of M.D. from the College of Medicine at the Univer-
sity of Milan (an A.M.A. accredited medical school), received an un-
restricted license to practice medicine and surgery from the New Jer-
sey State Board of Medical Examiners after passing the prescribed ex-
amination, completed internships at the Detroit Osteopathic Hospital
and St. Peter's General Hospital (the latter being approved by the
A.M.A.), consistently practiced surgery and obstetrics but not osteo-
pathy, is regarded by his medical colleagues as a qualified physician
and surgeon, and has not engaged in any conduct which would raise
any question as to his ethics and competency as a member of the med-
ical profession.
Id. at 584-87, 170 A.2d at 792-94.
53. 50 N.J. 389, 192A.2d 817 (1963).
54. Id. at 404, 192 A.2d at 825. The considerations on which the court re-
lied were similar to those given in Falcone. See notes 51, 52 supra.
55. For an analytical social science approach to defining and limiting ex-
pertise in the health professions, see FREDsON, supra note 40, at 335-82.
56. Limiting professional expertise is important, for excessive deference to
expertise is potentially inconsistent with the democratic ideal of individual
freedom. As society's reliance upon the expert increases, the layperson's abil-
ity to control the details of his everyday life decreases. Actions premised on
the application of professional expertise may be insulated from judicial and
legislative processes and from the critical eye of public debate; lay persons
may be precluded from participation in decisionmaking even when the deci-
sions are allegedly made for their own benefit. Id. at 335-38. See generally
IaEmmAN, supra note 37.
57. FPMDSON, supra note 40, at 336.
58. Id. at 45-46.
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diagnosis and treatment, which rely, in turn, on the scientific founda-
tion of medicine. The nontechnical zones, on the other hand, concern
institutions of medicine rather than medical science.59 While the
physician, for example, can claim expertise in the science of medicine,
he cannot claim expertise in the "liberal arts, humanities, and social
sciences of medicine 60 or "in matters concerning the organization,
distribution, and economics of medical care."'" Although an expert
in diagnosis and treatment, the physician is not necessarily an expert
in the economic, political, and social problems of medicine's institu-
tions. Such distinctions in individual professional expertise suggest
the appropriate limits of the expertise possessed by a health profes-
sional association. The association applies its true expertise only
when its decision or action concerns the development or content of
the scientific knowledge of medicine and is based upon that body of
knowledge.0 2
Even when the association is applying its expertise in setting stand-
ards, a court might find that a particular action cannot be determined
solely by the association's expertise. The expertise of professions
other than health care professions or the moderating influence of lay
opinion may be needed in resolving complex issues concerning stand-
ards. The expertise of the social sciences, for example, is needed in
the solution of many health care problems.6 3 Where the problem is
one of organization or delivery of health services, expertise in busi-
ness management and engineering may be as important as medical
expertise.64 As the Carnegie Report on higher education and health
noted, there is now an "extension of medical concerns beyond science
59. Id. at 341. See also Knowles, The Balanced Biology of the Teaching Hos-
pital, in HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 28, 39-41 (J. Knowles
ed. 1965); Mechanic, The Changing Structure of Medical Practice, 32 LAW &
CONTEM:P. PROB. 707, 709-716 (1967).
60. Knowles, supra note 59, at 28 (emphasis omitted).
61. Mechanic, supra note 59 at 707.
62. A recent Maine case illustrates the distinctions discussed in this section.
In Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civ. No. 74-45 (Me. Super. Ct. 1974), the
plaintiff hospital sought a court order prohibiting the withdrawal of artificial
life-support services from a severely deformed newborn infant. At the par-
ents' request, the attending physician had agreed to such withdrawal because
in his opinion the child's deformities, including the near certainty of permanent
brain damage, made the infant's life not worth preserving. The court inter-
vened to protect the child and observed that "the doctor's qualitative evalua-
tion of the value of the life to be preserved is not legally within the scope
of his expertise." But see Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976), upholding a hospital rule
that prohibited fathers from the delivery room, over a dissent criticizing the
majority for "bow[ing] to the expertise of the medical profession without the
benefit of an evidentiary hearing." 523 F.2d at 722 (Sprecher, J., dissenting).
63. See notes 57-61 supra and accompanying text. See also CARNEGIE
COMM'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 31, at 3-4, 45-46.
64. The point has been well made with specific reference to hospitals. "[I]t
is conceivable that business and engineering could eventually take over and
provide the two ingredients that are so often alleged to be missing: an in-
centive to managerial efficiency, and a systems approach to the organization
1976]
into economics, sociology, engineering, and many other fields."65
Similarly, lay opinion may be an important partner of medical exper-
tise in certain situations. The early twentieth century revolution in
medical education was accomplished not by the medical profession
alone, but by the profession's acting in concert with the lay assistance
of Abraham Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation.66 In hospitals,
broad policy has traditionally been set by neither the expert medical
staff nor the expert hospital administrator, but by the lay board of
trustees.67 As society becomes more complex, greater lay involve-
ment in professional affairs is needed. As technological advances
increase the number of specialties and professions, the likelihood that
a problem can be solved by a single specialty diminishes. A need is
emerging for the expertise "of the generalist who can weave together
into a workable whole the separate expertness of the specialists."
68
The issue of expertise can be analyzed in a wide range of profession-
al standard-setting activities. The accreditation of health education
programs is one prominent example. Accrediting policies regarding
class size and admissions may depend as much on considerations of
professional self-interest as on professional expertise.6 9 Standards
concerning management of the professional school or its relation to
the delivery system may involve business, economics, or engineering as
much as medical expertise. Some curriculum standards may require
education technology or learning psychology more than medical ex-
pertise, or may reflect lay value judgments on teaching technique
rather than scientific judgments based upon medical knowledge.70
Other standards, such as rank and tenure standards, may involve the
formulation of general social policies for which the expertise of the
generalist is as competent as that of the professional.
Public Interest and Concern
Professional associations affect public interests more -than traditional
private associations, such as fraternities and clubs. Traditional private
associations often operate in islands of privacy isolated from the rest
of society and its concerns. Professional associations, by contrast,
operate in areas of vital public interest. Accordingly, the public is
affected to a much greater degree by activities of professional associ-
ations and has a much greater interest in their operation.
Because of the public concern with professional associations, courts
should scrutinize their activities more closely than those of other
private associations. An increase in judicial scrutiny commensurate
of services." A. SOmERS, HosPrrAL REGULATION: THE DnLEanIMA OF PUBLIC PoL-
icy 14 (1969).
65. CARNEGIE COmm'N ON HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 31, at 4. See also
Engel & Hale, The Growing Industrialization of the Professions, in E. Freidson,
supra note 46 at 83-85.
66. See Thorne, Professional Education in Medicine, in EDUCATION FOR TUB
PROFESSIONS OF MEDICINE, LAW, THEOLOGY, AND SOCIAL WELFARE 20-24 (E.
Hughes ed. 1973); cf. Kessel supra note 49 at 267-72.
67. See SoMERs, supra note 64, at 18-21; Knowles, supra note 59, at 36-37.
68. W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAINTs 144
(1956). See generally A. ToFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 146-48, 289-90 (1970).
69. See GILB, supra note 45, at 55-60.
70. FREIDSON, supra note 40, at 344 n.8.
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with the -public interest has roots deep in the common law. The
"public callings" doctrine imposed special obligations, independent of
tort or contractual obligations, upon enterprises holding themselves
out as serving the community and thus "affected with a public in-
terest. '7 1 The Falcone decision gives currency to this common law
notion in the health context. In describing the defendant county
medical society, the court emphasized that the society was "not a
private voluntary membership association with which the public has
little or no concern. It is an association with which the public is
highly concerned and which engages in activities vitally affecting the
health and welfare of the people."7 2 The characterization in Falcone
can apply to almost every professional association in the health field;
each exerts extensive influence in a health care system that has been
accorded a "high priority ... in both public and private values
throughout the history of this country."
73
It is their standard-setting function that thrusts health professional
associations most deeply into the public arena. By setting standards
for professional conduct, the associations influence societal decisions
about health care. Public reliance upon these professional standards
reinforces the social impact of association action and generates public
concern with association activities. The associations' standard-setting
activities cannot, therefore, be considered solely "internal affairs,"74
since a vital public interest in association activities transcends the
particular interests of the association. As guardians of the public
interest,75 courts should be more concerned with the activities of
professional associations than with those of associations exerting less
impact upon society. The greater the public interest in an associa-
tion's activities, the greater should be the likelihood of judicial scru-
tiny of those activities.
Harm
An association's potential for harming individuals or the public in-
creases as its influence on society increases. Courts are sensitive to
71. See note 36 supra. For an overview of this early common law and its
modern import, see Tobriner and Grodin, supra note 34, at 1249-54.
72. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 596-97, 170 A.2d
791, 799 (1961).
73. Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564, 572 (W.D. Mich. 1966);
see Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 & n.14 (1974). State-
ments of American presidents are used sometimes to illustrate this idea. The
court in Ellis quoted President Jefferson: "Without health there is no happi-
ness. An attention to health, then, should take the place of every other ob-
ject." 257 F. Supp. at 572. In Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, the Su-
preme Court quoted President Nixon: "'It is health which is real wealth,' said
Ghandi, 'and not pieces of gold and silver.'" 415 U.S. at 259 n.14. See gen-
erally text accompanying notes 5-31 supra.
74. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 75 Cal. Rptr. 712,
717-19 (Ct. App.), vacated on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81
Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); see Chafee, supra note 38, at 1021-23.
75. See notes 3, 4 supra; notes 115-17 infra.
19761
questions of harm, for most law suits are premised upon injury to
personal or proprietary rights. The likelihood of judicial scrutiny of
association affairs should increase, therefore, in proportion to the
seriousness of the harm caused by association action.
The harm resulting from the action of private associations most
often arises where membership is at issue. The cases fall into two
categories: expulsion-the termination of an existing membership-
and exclusion-the denial of an application for membership. Although
the courts traditionally have been more hesitant to intervene in cases
of exclusions than in those of expulsions,76 the distinction is now made
less frequently in professional association cases. Both individuals and
society are affected as much by professional exclusions as by expul-
sions, especially in the health professions. "[T]n either case the
critical question would seem to be the extent of harm suffered by the
person excluded or expelled."
7 7
A health professional association's potential for inflicting serious
harm is not limited to membership decisions; it inheres in all the
association's standard-setting activities. An individual denied certifi-
cation or a school denied professional accreditation, for example, is
denied a valuable status whose absence can cause significant harm.
Such denials can be as harmful as exclusion or expulsion from mem-
bership, and they should be similarly -treated by the courts.
In scrutinizing actions of health professional associations, the courts
should look to the character of the status or privilege that the associ-
ation has denied or terminated. The greater the importance of the
status or privilege, the greater is the injury to the deprived party.
And the greater the harm, the more likely it is -that "courts ... [will
scrutinize] the standards and procedures employed by the association
notwithstanding their recognition of the fact that professional societies
possess a specialized competence in evaluating the qualifications of an
individual to engage in professional activities.178  Some courts have
stated that professional status must be a "virtual prerequisite to ...
practice,179 an "economic necessity,"80 or a "necessity for successful
76. See, e.g., Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191,
199-202, 238 A.2d 665, 669-71 (1968). The rationale for the distinction has been
that a member gains certain membership rights, particularly the rights em-
bodied in his "contract" with the association, which he is entitled to protect
See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text The nonmember has none of
those rights.
77. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 656 n.29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970), rev'g, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969). See also, e.g., Blende
v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 243 n.1, 393 P.2d 926, 928 n.1
(1964).
78. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970).
79. Id., citing Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 51 N.J. 582, 170
A.2d 791 (1961); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945);
Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 75 Cal. Rptr. 71 (Ct. App.
1969).
80. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 591, 170 A.2d
582, 796-97 (1961).
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operation""' before the courts will review its denial or termination.
Too literally construed, however, such ,phrases are overly restrictive
characterizations of the harm required for judicial review. Important
interests other than pure job protection may be at stake. These other
interests include professional standing in the community and among
peers, access to professional services and benefits such as liability
insurance and continuing education programs, and the opportunity to
participate actively in the governance of the profession.8 2 Sub-
stantial deprivation of such advantages should be sufficient to trigger
judicial review.83
The courts should also consider the larger social harm that may
result from some professional association actions. If a physician is
denied membership in a local medical society and is thus deprived of
access to the society's education programs, not only is he harmed, but
his patients and, ultimately, society may be harmed. Similarly, if a
medical school is denied accreditation and experiences the multiple
disadvantages accompanying unaccredited status, not only is the
school harmed, but its students and faculty, and perhaps society may
be harmed as well.8 4 Such social harm, in many instances, may be a
more important consideration than the individual party's injury. The
presence of social harm not only requires the court to consider matters
other than narrow and technical inquiries of "economic necessity;"
it lessens the justification for an association's claim of autonomy.8 5
Because autonomy is premised upon the societal value of private asso-
ciations, it follows that when the association is harming society, there
is less reason to respect its autonomy as to the matter causing harm.
81. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 469 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d
650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
82. See Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166,
460 P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (realization of "maximum poten-
tial achievement and recognition in . . . specialty"), vacating, 75 Cal. Rptr.
712, 717 (Ct. App. 1969) (professional distinction and participation in advanced
specialty training); Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal.
2d 42, 52-54, 409 P.2d 934, 940-42, 48 Cal. Rptr. 710, 716-18 (1966) (participa-
tion in institutional life of association); Kronen v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of
Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 304, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808, 819 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966) (prestige and attendant economic "advantages" of
specialty practice); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402, 192 A.2d 817,
824 (1963) (needs of patients).
83. Several courts have reached such a conclusion. See Marjorie Webster
Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc.,
432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Pinsker v. Pa-
cific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 75 Cal. Rptr. 712, 717-19 (Ct. App.), vacated
on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); Davis
v. Morristown Mem. Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 39, 254 A.2d 125, 128-29 (1969).
See also note 82 supra.
84. If the association is applying its special expertise to protect the public
from professional incompetence, its decision may benefit rather than harm so-
ciety. Thus, the court's consideration of societal harm must be intertwined
with its consideration of expertise. See text accompanying notes 47-70 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 38-46 supra.
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When harm to society is the focus, moreover, the court considers
social goals rather than merely the association's goals, a task for
which the judiciary is presumably more competent than the associa-
tion.
The Monopoly Power Theory
The weight courts should give each of the preceding four considera-
tions-autonomy, expertise, public interest, and harm-will vary
according to the kind of association and the nature of the association's
action. When the association represents a health profession and the
action affects professional standards, public interest and harm are
likely to outweigh professional autonomy and expertise so as to
justify judicial scrutiny of the contested association action. Such a
balancing of interests is sometimes expressed under the rubric of
"monopoly power."8 6 Although the monopoly power theory does not
explicitly recognize and balance each of these four considerations, the
theory is premised on policy concerns similar to those underlying the
four considerations.
To possess monopoly power, an association must control access to
some important professional status or privilege so that individual
practitioners or professional schools or programs must turn to the
association to obtain the benefits accompanying the status or priv-
ilege. The association's resulting "stranglehold" enables it to influence
significantly members or prospective members of the profession seek-
ing the status or privilege controlled by the association.8 7 Addition-
ally, because the association operates in an area of vital public con-
cern, its actions have a significant impact upon society. This power
to affect both the profession and the general public is in the nature
of monopoly power because the association alone can bestow the
particular status or privilege. The more the public relies upon the
association, the greater its monopoly power; the greater its monopoly
power, the greater is the association's capacity to harm the profes-
sion's actual and prospective members, as well as the general public.
The reservoir of monopoly power held by professional associations
has been enlarged by the current trend toward greater concentrations
of private power and increased reliance by government and the public
upon such concentrations of power.88 This is particularly true in the
health professions. Government has given various health professions
legal monopolies over the performance of their work. In organizing
to protect this legal monopoly, professional associations have them-
86. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 469 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); notes 90-94 infra.
A similar but more generalized type of balancing process could also justify
legislative intervention into areas dominated by professional monopoly power.
See note 4 supra; notes 225-26 infra and accompanying text. Courts have their
own role to play in the absence of or as a supplement to legislative action.
87. See Chafee, supra note 38, at 1021-23.
88. See generally GILB, supra note 45; HuRsT, supra note 44, at 63-64.
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selves, in some ways, become virtual monopolies.8 9 Courts have taken
increasing notice of this trend since the Falcone decision in 1961. In
analyzing the powers of a local medical society, the Falcone court
spoke of "professional associations exercising virtually monopolistic
control" and determined that:
[T]he County Medical Society . is an association with which
the public is highly concerned .... Through its interrelation-
ships, the County Medical Society possesses, in fact, a virtual
monopoly over the use of local hospital facilities. As a result it
has power, by excluding Dr. Falcone from membership, to pre-
clude him from successfully continuing in his practice of obstet-
rics and surgery and to restrict patients who wish to engage him
as an obstetrician or surgeon in their freedom of choice of physi-
cians. Public policy strongly dictates that this power should not
be unbridled .... 90
Courts subsequently have applied the monopoly power theory to other
local medical societies,91 local and national specialty societies,92 hos-
pital staffs,9 3 and with some qualifications, accrediting associations. 4
Theories of Liability in Professional Association Disputes
If, after balancing considerations such as those suggested above, a
court decides that judicial scrutiny of a particular association's action
is warranted, the -plaintiff must base his cause of action against the
association on some theory of liability. Associations have been held
liable for their actions on five different theories: Contract; tort;
public trust; antitrust; and state action. There is no consensus
among the courts on which theory is the most suitable for handling
professional power problems.
Under the contract theory, a private association is a conglomerate of
contractual relationships. The association's rules form the basis of
the contract, and each association member contracts with the associ-
ation and with every other member to abide by the rules. When
89. See FimIsoN, supra note 40, at 27-33 (American Medical Association).
90. 34 N.J. at 596-97, 170 A.2d at 799.
91. Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926
(1964).
92. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); cf. Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathol-
ogists, 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
93. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
94. See Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Marlboro Corp. v. Association
of Independent Colleges & Schools, 416 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1976); cf. Rock-
land Institute v. Association of Independent Colleges & Schools, 412 F. Supp.
1015 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See also Kaplin, The Marjorie Webster Decisions on
Accreditation, 52 EDUC. REc. 219 (1971).
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the association or a member violates a rule, a breach of contract
results.9 8  In Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hospital Associa-
tion,96 for example, the court held that the defendant hospital
breached the contract embodied in its medical staff bylaws by revok-
ing the plaintiff staff member's privileges without providing the
hearing required in the bylaws.
The contract theory provides narrow grounds for judicial involve-
ment in associational affairs. Since privity of contract is required, the
theory extends only to disputes between the association and a
member, leaving untouched disputes between the association and
applicants for membership or other individuals adversely affected by
association action. Even when the dispute is between the association
and a member, the contract theory affords relief only when an associ-
ation rule applies to the dispute and the association has violated the
rule. The contract theory, moreover, is the most rigid of the theories
applicable to private associations. Recovery depends upon legal
technicalities concerning the nature of intra-associational relation-
ships, and the association's societal functions or influence are not
considered. The theory has been aptly described as "a legal fiction
which prevents the courts from considering attentively the genuine
reasons for and against relief."97
Several theories of tort liability have potential applicability in
association disputes, depending on the factual circumstances and the
jurisdiction in which the suit arises. These tort theories are gen-
erally applicable in both suits against association members individually
and suits against the association itself. When the dispute is between
the association and a member, -the tort alleged may simply be
wrongful interference with the membership relationship. In Higgins
v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists,9" the court ordered the
plaintiff recertified as a pathologist and reinstated in the association's
registry, asserting that "the real reason for judicial relief . . . is the
protection of the member's valuable personal relationship to the
association and the status conferred by that relationship .... . 'The
wrong is a tort, not a breach of contract . . . . "99
Other theories of tort liability can be invoked by applicants for
membership and third parties, as well as by association members.
The developing theory of tortious interference with prospective advan-
tage"'0 is perhaps most adaptable to problems of professional power.
95. Chafee, supra note 38, at 1001-07. See, e.g., North Dakota v. North Cen-
tral Ass'n, 99 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1938); Medical Soc'y v. Walker, 245 Ala.
135, 16 So. 2d 321 (1944); Gashsai v. Maine Medical Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571 (Me.
1976).
96. 395 Pa. 257, 149 A.2d 456 (1959).
97. Chafee, supra note 38, at 1007. But cf. note 174 infra.
98. 51 N.J. 191, 238 A.2d 665 (1968).
99. Id. at 200, 238 A.2d at 669-70, quoting Chafee, supra note 38, at 1007.
100. See Estes, Expanding Horizons in the Law of Torts-Tortious Interfer-
ence, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 341 (1974). The elements of this tort are:
(1) the present or probable future existence of a contract, business
relations or business expectancy beneficial to the injured person; (2)
knowledge of the contract, relations or expectancy on the part of the
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This theory covers a broad range of situations where the association
or certain of its members intentionally interfere with important pro-
fessional relations or business expectancies. In Cowan v. Gibson,10 1
for example, the court ruled the complaint sufficient to state a cause
of action in tort when the plaintiff physician, who had been denied
staff privileges, alleged that the defendant hospital staff members and
trustees had conspired to interfere with his occupational pursuits and
his contractual relations with patients. 0 2 The tort of "concerted
refusal to deal" is applicable if the plaintiff alleges that the associa-
tion misused competitive devices to interrupt plaintiff's professional
pursuits. 0 3 When professional reputation has been harmed, as
usually occurs when an association withdraws or refuses certification,
accreditation or other symbols of professional status, the tort of
defamation may apply.'0 4 The theory of prima facie tort may be
useful in novel situations. Under this theory, an association would be
liable for any intentional infliction of injury unless the action was
justified in light of the competing private and public interests con-
cerned.
0 5
The third theory of liability recognized by courts, a public trust or
fiduciary theory, is premised upon a functional analysis of a profes-
sional association's relationship to society and is closely associated
with the monopoly power concept.' 00 The origins of the theory can
be traced to the "public callings" decisions of early common law
0 7
and, more recently, to decisions on membership policies of labor
unions.'0 8 The Falcone decisions'0 9 in 1960 and 1961 mark the
interferer; (3) intentional interference which induces or causes a ter-
mination of the contract or foreclosure of the business relations or ex-
pectancy and, (4) resultant damage.
Id. at 343.
101. 392 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1965).
102. Id. at 310; see, e.g., Willis v. Santa Aria Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58
Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962); Raymond v. Cregar, 38
N.J. 472, 185 A.2d 856 (1962).
103. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HAnv. L. REV. 888,
929-32 (1964).
104. See Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for
Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 46, 76-81 (1972). For a recent explication
of first amendment standards applicable to defamation suits see Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
105. The principle of prima facie tort is that "prima facie, the intentional
infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of sub-
stantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification
if the defendant is to escape." Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904);
cf. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975) (en banc). See generally Forkosch,
An Analysis of the "'Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CoRNELL L.Q. 465
(1957).
106. See text accompanying notes 86-94 suzpra.
107. See note 71 supra and accompanying text; cf. Bisso v. Inland Water-
ways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1955) (modern reliance upon "public calling"
concept).
108. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
109. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
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theory's first direct application to a health professional association:
Public policy strongly dictates that this power [i.e., the monopoly
power of a local medical society] ... should be viewed judicially
as a fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable and lawful
manner for the advancement of the interests of the medical pro-
fession and the public generally .... 10
The public trust or fiduciary theory correctly recognizes the pro-
fessional associations' powerful role in modem society and imposes
upon the associations a commensurate duty to act as fiduciaries of
the public. It is the most difficult theory of liability to apply and to
contain in specific cases because "public interest" and "public policy"
are abstractions neither readily grasped nor defined."" Used without
a keen sense of judicial restraint, these abstractions can lead to judi-
cial infringement on legislative prerogatives;112 courts have often
stated that "primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public
policy of the State."
11 8
The public trust theory is both the most straightforward theory that
courts have utilized in private association cases and the one most
adaptable to the special problems posed by professional associations.
It encompasses considerations of autonomy, expertise, public interest,
and harm. Although the theory must be developed to balance more
explicitly these four considerations and to define more clearly the
relevant sources of public policy," 4 it is nevertheless compatible with
historical concepts of the judicial function. The common law "is
made up of adjustments or compromises of conflicting individual
interests in which we turn to some social interest, frequently under
the name of public policy, to determine the limits of a reasonable
adjustment."1 5 Judicial equity powers have also traditionally focused
upon protection of the public interest; the more deeply public inter-
ests are involved in a controversy, the more broadly and flexibly
courts have exercised their equity powers." 6 Thus, both common
(1961), aff'g 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960); see text accompanying
notes 51-52 supra.
110. Id. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799; see Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v.
Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459,
470 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970) (concerning private accrediting associations, "[ijn view of the great
reliance placed on accreditation by the public and the government, these asso-
ciations must assume responsibility not only to their membership but also to
society"); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 397-402, 192 A.2d 817, 821-
24 (1963) (concerning private hospitals, "powers are deeply imbedded in pub-
lic aspects, and are rightly viewed, for policy reasons ... as fiduciary
[responsibility] .... ").
111. See notes 3-4 supra for definitions. For an extended analytical frame-
work for public policy and public interest analysis, see 3 R. PoUND, JURISPRU-
DENCE §§ 92-93 (1959).
112. See R. POUND, supra note 111, § 93, at 272; Muschany v. United States,
324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945). For an overview and debate regarding the judge's
role as public policy maker and the difficulties of identifying and distinguish-
ing public and private interests see AUERBACH, GARRasON, HURST & MERI N,
TBE LEGAL PROCEss 66-148 (1961).
113. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931).
114. See text accompanying notes 180-94 infra.
115. R. PouND, supra note 111, § 93, at 270; see note 187 infra.
116. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383 (1965); Porter
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). In Porter, the Court empha-
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law and equity conceptions of the judicial function parallel the judi-
cial role that the public trust theory requires of reviewing courts.
1 1 7
Other theories of liability against professional associations can be
based on the Sherman Antitrust Act"18 or state antitrust statutes and
constitutional provisions.1 9 Since such theories of liability usually
are derived from statutes authorizing judicial involvement, they pose
less danger of impinging on legislative functions than does the
public trust theory. Antitrust statutes, moreover, afford a greater
range of remedies than those available under other theories of lia-
bility. Under the Sherman Act, for example, injunctive relief and
treble damages are available to private litigants, and injunctive relief,
actual damages, criminal fines, and imprisonment may be sought by
the United States. 20 Antitrust theories also have a broader economic
focus than the other theories of recovery and, consequently, may offer
more appropriate solutions to disputes concerning patterns of entry
into a profession,' 21 competitive relationships between professions,122
sized that equity powers should be exercised without undue deference to the
legislative branch and should yield only in response to a clear legislative com-
mand. Id.
117. Courts have identified public policy and public interests in the manner
envisioned by the public trust theory both historically under the public call-
ings doctrine, see notes 71, 107 supra and accompanying text, and in many
modern areas of judicial activity, such as in the labor union and health profes-
sional association cases. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text. Cf.
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 89-91 (1954) (towboat owners
prohibited by public policy from using economic position to enforce exculpa-
tory towing clause); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187 (D.D.C.
1970) (minutes of hospital staff meetings entitled to qualified privilege under
1970 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because of interest in free flow of
information among staff members); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D.
(D.D.C. 1970) (same; pre-1970 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Awceka v.
Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971) (public interest in protect-
ing tenants' statutory rights justifies cause of action for retaliatory eviction);
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (public labor policy
prohibits bad faith termination of oral employment contract); Rosenthal v.
Harwood, 35 N.Y.2d 469, 323 N.E.2d 179, 363 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1974) (political
party prohibited by public interest in an impartial judiciary from imposing
partisan loyalty requirements on judicial candidates).
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Under section
1 of the Sherman Act,
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be Illegal. ..
Id. § 1. Section 3 contains a comparable provision for restraints occurring
within the District of Columbia or federal territories. Id. § 3; see American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). A finding that the alleged
trade restraint affects interstate commerce is a predicate to application of sec-
tion 1 but not section 3. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
119. See, e.g., Group Health Cooperative v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39
Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951). Many state antitrust statutes contain re-
straint of trade language similar to that in the Sherman Act. For a compila-
tion of state antitrust provisions, see 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 30,000-35,501
(1974).
120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3-4, 15, 15a, 26 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
121. See generally Wallace, supra note 104 at 89-110.
122. See United States v. College of Am. Pathologists, 1969 Trade Cas.
1 72,825 (N.D. Ill. 1969); American Soc'y for Medical Technology v. American
Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, Civ. No. 69-C-1028 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (complaint
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or restrictions on the organizational forms of health services deliv-
ery.1
2 3
The application of antitrust theories to health professional associa-
tions has been limited by occasional judicial recognition of what is
called the "learned professions" or "professional" exemption from
antitrust laws. Courts have created this exemption by limiting the
Sherman Act prohibition of combinations in restraint of "trade or
commerce" to business and commercial activities, thus excluding the
activities of professions and professional associations.' 24  Similar
distinctions have been made under state antitrust laws. 25 American
Medical Association v. United States, 26 the leading health profession
decision in this area, is inconclusive concerning the existence of a
professional exemption. Although the Supreme Court enjoined the
AMA from inhibiting the operation of the Group Health Association,
a nonprofit prepaid medical services plan, the Court avoided deciding
whether the practice of medicine was within the Sherman Act. The
Court found instead that Group Health itself was engaged in the
"business or trade" of securing "services and facilities" for its mem-
bers.1
2 7
In a recent decision concerning the legal profession, however, the
Supreme Court disavowed the existence of any absolute professional
exemption from antitrust liability. In holding that defendants'
minimum fee schedule system constituted price-fixing, the Court in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 28 stated that the "nature of an occu-
pation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman
Act . . . nor is the public service aspect of professional practice
controlling in determining whether § 1 includes professions.' 1 29 The
Court was careful, however, to limit the scope of its holding:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as inter-
dismissed) (related litigation concerning pathologists' alleged control over
medical laboratories and medical technologists). See generally Miller, Struc-
ture of Accreditation of Health Educational Programs, in SASHEP, supra note
7, at B-24 to B-26.
123. See generally Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the
Market for Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 716, 767-81 (1970).
124. E.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103 (D.
Ore. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). See generally Bauer,
Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NoTmRE DuvM LAW. 570, 571-
92 (1975).
125. E.g., Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376
P.2d 568, 26 CaL Rptr. 640 (1962); In re Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480,
355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974) (legal profession). But see Group Health Cooperative
v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 637-38, 237 P.2d 737, 765 (1951).
126. 317 U.S. 519 (1942).
127. The court of appeals had faced the question directly and refused to rec-
ognize the existence of a professional exemption. See American Medical Ass'n
v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 236-38 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
128. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
129. Id. at 787. For recent government actions that may test application
of this principle to the health professions, see United States v. American Phar-
maceutical Ass'n, complaint filed, No. G75-558-CA5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 24,
1975); In re American Medical Ass'n, complaint filed, F.T.C. Docket No. 9064
(Dec. 22, 1975); Proposed Trade Reg. § 447, Disclosure Regulations Concerning
Retail Prices for Prescription Drugs, 40 Fed. Reg. 24031 (1975), all concerning
professional association prohibitions against advertising.
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changeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the
professions, may require that a particular practice, which could
properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another
context, be treated differently.'3 0
The different treatment of professions could manifest itself in a
qualified professional exemption applicable where the business aspect
of a profession is not involved. 131 If such an exemption is recognized,
it should only be where a profession engages in self-regulation in a
manner affording procedural safeguards to those upon whom the
regulatory burden falls.132 Even without such a qualified exemption,
the health professions could be "treated differently" under the rule
of reason 3 3 used in judging restraints of trade. The flexibility of the
rule of reason would permit consideration of the public service and
other unique aspects of the professions.
34
The last theory of liability is the constitutional or state action theory.
The federal constitutional requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection 3 5 apply directly to governmental entities and instrumental-
ities in the health field. Except for state licensing boards'36 and
medical staffs in government hospitals,137 however, most health
professional activity is private action, which is not normally subject
to the constitutional restraints limiting exercises of governmental
130. 421 U.S. at 787 n.17.
131. See id. at 792-93. The District of Columbia Circuit adopted essentially
this position in Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 965 (1970), and refused to apply the Sherman Act to the "non-com-
mercial aspects" of professional activity. The Ninth Circuit may have been
suggesting a similar approach in refusing to recognize a professional exemption
from the prohibition of price-fixing on the ground that pricing policy is "an
area of 'entreprenurial,' rather than professional activity. . . ." Northern Cal.
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 385 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); cf. Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman
Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 705 (1962).
132. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361-67 (1963).
The development of a qualified professional exemption ultimately would de-
pend on a judicial definition of "learned profession." See In re Freeman, 34
N.Y.2d 1, 7, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339 (1974), for one such at-
tempt under state antitrust law. It is questionable whether such an exemption
should cover the full range of health professions and paraprofessions.
133. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918);
cf. Northern Pac. R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (per se rules). See
generally Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refus-
als to Deal, 1970 DuKE L.J. 247; Coons, supra note 131; 66 Colum. L. Rev.
1486 (1966).
134. See United States Dental Institute v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396
F. Supp. 565, 579-81 (N.D. I.L 1975); Bauer, supra note 124, at 584-92.
135. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V. Due process and
equal protection are and will likely remain the constitutional guarantees most
often invoked against professional associations under state action theories.
136. E.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); see note 29 supra.
137. E.g., Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d
173 (5th Cir. 1971). Government hospitals are usually county or municipal
hospitals.
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power. For the Constitution to reach ostensibly private activity,
courts must find the activity to be sufficiently public to constitute
state action. The basis for this transformation is whether "to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have been involved"'13 in the private activity, an inquiry
which "frequently admits of no easy answer."13 9
Courts have used three theories to reach private activity under the
state action doctrine. The delegated power theory applies when a
private corporation, association, or other entity acts as an agent of
government in exercising powers assigned to it by government.
140
The public function theory applies when a private entity fulfills a
governmental function with the implied consent of the government. 141
The government contacts theory applies when a private entity obtains
a significant amount of its power, prestige, or resources from the
government.-4 2 The following discussion briefly outlines the poten-
tial application of each theory to professional associations in the
health professions.
Many states have delegated to the state associations of various
health professions the power to nominate members of the licensing
board for their particular profession. 43 Several courts have declared
that a state association performing this function acts as an agent of
the state and that those associational actions relating to this function,
including admission of new association members are subject to the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Likewise, when mem-
bership in a local society is a prerequisite to membership in the state
association, courts have held the local society's membership policies
to the same constitutional standards as those of the state association.
4 4
In Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association
of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc.,145 the United States District
Court of the District of Columbia applied the delegated power theory
to the regional accrediting associations recognized by the United States
Commissioner of Education under aid-to-education statutes as reliable
authorities on the quality of training at particular institutions. The
district court found that such associations "have operated as service
agencies for the federal government in determining eligibility for
138. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
139. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972). Conversely,
extensive state involvement in ostensibly private activity may sometimes serve
to exempt such activity from liability under antitrust theories. See Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943); cf. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773, 790-92 (1975).
140. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-66 (1944); Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1968).
141. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976).
142. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961);
cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
143. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text. Delegation ordinarily
is accomplished by state statute or administrative regulation.
144. Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966);
Bell v. Georgia Dental Ass'n, 231 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ga. 1964); Firestone v.
First Dist. Dental Soc'y, 59 Misc. 2d 362, 299 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
145. 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
146. 302 F. Supp. at 478; see id. at 470, 477-78. The court of appeals did
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funding."146 The same reasoning might apply to professional accredit-
ing associations recognized by the Commissioner,' 47 including those
in the health professions, and thus subject their accrediting activities
to constitutional requirements. Additionally, the delegated power
theory of state action might apply to Professional Standards Review
Organizations, recently established by federal statute, 48 and to some
of the medical service plans created or regulated by state law.149
The public function theory of state action, while somewhat over-
lapping the delegated power theory, focuses less on formal relation-
ships with government and more on the performance of an activity
traditionally reserved to government. Since standard setting for
health care has traditionally been a prerogative of government under
the police power,150 a professional association that sets health stand-
ards in lieu of the government and with the government's acquies-
ence arguably fulfills a governmental function. This theory has
been utilized as an alternative to the delegated power theory when
a health professional association is intimately involved in the selection
of a governmental board or commission. In Hawkins v. North Caro-
lina Dental Society,'5' the court held defendant's activity to be state
action by reasoning:
[H]ere the Dental Society appears to be functioning clearly as
the agent of the State in the selection of the dental members of
the state's boards and commissions. Our conclusion is not depend-
ent, however, upon a finding of fact to that effect. It is enough
that North Carolina in some of its manifestations has involved
itself in the Society's activities and that the Society's exercise of
its powers of practical control or significant influence in the selec-
tion of state officials is a public function performed under the
general aegis of the state. 52
The public function theory also may apply to professional accrediting
not disagree with this reasoning and "assume[d], without deciding, that either
the nature of [Middle States'] activities . . . or the federal recognition which
they are awarded renders them state action subject to the limitations of the
Fifth Amendment." 432 F.2d at 658.
147. Accrediting agencies apply for this recognition pursuant to procedures
and criteria predetermined by the Commissioner, and a recognized agency re-
mains subject to periodic review by the Commissioner. See Finkin, Federal
Reliance on Voluntary Accreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power
to Regulate, 2 J. LAW & ED. 339 (1973). But see Marlboro Corp. v. Association
of Independent Colleges & Schools, 416 F.Supp. 958 (1976). For a finding of
state action in a roughly analogous situation see Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
148. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. 92-603, § 249 F, 86 Stat. 1429, amending,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-20 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1301, 1320b-1320c-19 (Supp. II, 1975)); see note 10 supra and accompanying
text.
149. Cf. Godfrey v. Massachusetts Medical Serv., 359 Mass. 610, 270 N.E.2d
804 (1971). But see Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 536 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.
1976).
150. See notes 228-36 infra and accompanying text.
151. 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966).
152. Id. at 722-23.
1976]
activities on which state and federal governments widely rely as an
alternative to governmental standard setting.'5 3 In most instances,
however, the blurry distinction between governmental and private
activity in the health field makes it difficult to determine what
functions are sufficiently associated with government to constitute
state action.'
5 4
The third state action theory, the government contacts theory, has
been the theory most discussed in recent litigation'55 and probably has
the greatest potential applicability to health professional associations.
The activities of private hospitals, in particular, have been scruti-
nized under this theory, and certain activities, such as staff appoint-
ments, have been held subject to the constitutional requirements of
due process and equal protection. A private hospital's most signifi-
cant government contact is usually receipt of federal funds for hos-
pital construction and modernization, which must be spent in accord-
ance with state planning and use requirements.' 56 Some courts find
the use of such funds alone sufficient to transform private hospital
activity into state action; 57 other courts require additional govern-
ment contacts before finding state action. 58 Recent decisions con-
cerning medical staff determinations have refined the government
contacts theory, considering not merely whether the government
involved itself in the hospital's operation, but whether such involve-
ment extended to the particular activity causing plaintiff's alleged
153. See Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Col-
leges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 470, 478 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). See also Parish v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975)
(NCAA's activities are state action because NCAA performs traditional gov-
ernmental function of coordinating intercollegiate athletics); Comment, The
Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problems in Judicial
Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 104, 117-19 (1966).
For other possible applications of the public function theory to health profes-
sional associations, see Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 968
(4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (private hospitals); 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1186, 1188 (1962); 74 YALE L.J. 1313, 1320-21 (1965) (state and local
medical societies).
154. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court
appears to limit public functions to those "traditionally exclusively reserved
to the State," see id. at 352, or "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State." See id. at 353. In separate dissenting opinions, Justices Marshall and
Douglas argue that the public function theory should be based on balancing
considerations similar to those of autonomy and public concern discussed
earlier in this article and should take into account the private entity's monop-
oly power. See id. at 362-63, 366.
155. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Howard
Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Asso-
ciated Students v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1974). See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); notes 157-58 infra.
156. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Hill-Burton Act), 42
U.S.C. §§ 291-291j (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975), formerly, ch. 958, 60
Stat. 1041. Under this law, states prepare state plans and designate state plan-
ning agencies through which federal funds are granted to public and private
nonprofit hospitals in the state.
157. E.g., Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.
1969); Simpkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964). Contra, Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center,
520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
158. E.g., O'Neill v. Grayson County War Mem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140 (6th
Cir. 1973); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
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injury 59 Where government involvement is not so extensive as to
permeate all hospital activity, 6 0 this latter question will significantly
limit the theory's future application to medical staff decisions, as well
as other health professional association activities.
Despite their difficulties of application, the three state action
theories will grow in importance as private concentrations of power
become increasingly significant in American life and more aligned
with government. "The conditions of modern institutional life tend
strongly to break down the distinction between the law of the political
state and the internal law of associations."'161 Already, "for the
stronger professional associations, [government] is a continuum, a
matter of continual interaction and close integration between private
and public governments."'61 2 As these trends increase, courts will be
more likely to consider private professional action sufficiently public
to incur constitutional sanctions.
Scope of Judicial Review of Professional Association Activities
A court deciding to review the action of a professional association
must delineate the scope of its review. It must determine both the
depth of its inquiry into the rules, policies, and practices of a profes-
sional association and the standards it will use to measure the validity
of the association's action.
The above discussion of autonomy, expertise, public interest, and
harm provides some notion of how actively and by what methodology
courts should review professional association action. In general, the
greater the weight of public interest and harm in relation to autonomy
and expertise, the more probing judicial review should be. The
theories of liability also provide some assistance in determining the
proper scope of review since each suggests certain review standards.
These theories are sufficiently vague and difficult to apply to profes-
sional associations, however, that additional guidance may be desir-
able.
159. E.g., Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th
Cir. 1973); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973); see
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). But cf. Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
160. Compare O'Neill v. Grayson County War Mnem. Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140
(6th Cir. 1973), with Greco v. Orange Men'. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975), Doe v. Bellin Men. Hosp., 479 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1973), and Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.
1973). See Justice White's analysis of these issues in his dissent, in which
Chief Justice Burger joined, to the denial of certiorari in Greco v. Orange
Mere. Hosp. Corp. supra.
161. Fuller, Two Principles of Human Association, in VOLUNTARY AssoCIA-
TIONs, supra note 37, at 14; see notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
162. C. GivB, supra note 45, at 156.
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In considering scope of review, situations where the association
action is alleged to be procedurally invalid must be distinguished from
those where the alleged invalidity is substantive. Courts will scru-
tinize procedural defects in an association's decisionmaking more
carefully than the association's substantive standards and policies.
The difference is between the procedures followed and the criteria
relied upon in making a decision. Courts are well versed in proce-
dural problems, while professional associations have no such special
competence; hence, a broad scope of review is likely. Concerning
substantive problems, however, the association may be engaged in a
standard-setting role inextricably implicating its professional exper-
tise.163 If so, courts are likely to defer to the association's special
competence; hence, a narrower scope of review is employed.
164
A variety of judicial statements have been made with regard to the
scope of review appropriate to professional association action. The
statements are usually somewhat cryptic, and the grounds relied
upon in adopting a particular scope of review are sometimes not
enunciated. Little consensus has been reached on the appropriate
test to apply in particular cases. It is possible, however, to detect
three broad levels of judicial review employed by the courts.
At the first and shallowest level of judicial review, courts deter-
mine only whether the association has violated its own rules. This is
the type of limited review traditionally accorded private associations.
It comports with the contract theory, which holds that action contra-
vening association rules is a breach of the association's contract with
its members for which judicial relief generally is available.16 5 This
first level of review applies with equal force to substantive and pro-
cedural rules, provided the rules are clear enough to be understood
by the court. When a rule is so vague that the court must interpret
it before determining whether the rule was violated, courts may defer
to the association's interpretation, particularly if the rule is a sub-
stantive one. Review on the first level is thus relatively simple and
straightforward, 166 although limited. Though useful within its nar-
row confines, it is not adaptable to most of the problems regarding
professional associations and is therefore of little utility in solving
them.
163. See text accompanying notes 47-70 supra.
164. E.g., Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d
173, 176 (5th Cir. 1971) (public hospital board); Marjorie Webster Jr. College,
Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d
650, 656 n.28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970) (college accreditation
association); Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 245-46,
393 P.2d 926, 930 (1964) (medical society board of censors).
165. E.g., Smith v. Kern County Medical Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874
(1942). See text accompanying notes 95-97 supra; Chafee, supra note 38,
1001-07.
166. Sometimes, however, a court will utilize the first level of review only
with the proviso that the association's rules "must not contravene public law,
nor any principle of public policy." Medical Soc. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 138,
16 So. 2d 321, 324 (1944) (citation omitted); accord, Bernstein v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 246-47 n.5, 293 P.2d 862,
865 n.5 (1956). This is a step in the direction of the more complex level three
review described in the text accompanying notes 180-94 infra.
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The second level of review is somewhat of a catchall. It encom-
passes a variety of tests, most of which are described by shorthand
phrases supported by little theoretical analysis. These second level
tests share a common background and design: they are attempts
to provide judicial review more flexible and probing than that
afforded on the first level, while, at the same time, protecting the
private associations' autonomy in all but clear cases of abuse of
associational powers.
Perhaps the oldest and narrowest test utilized at the second level
is that of "good faith." It is primarily a substantive test that permits
limited judicial inquiry into the reasons for the action and invalidates
actions not motivated by a legitimate association objective. 167 A sim-
ilar test was used in North Dakota v. North Central Association,"6 8 the
first major accreditation litigation. Holding for the defendant associ-
ation, the court required that the association's decisions be free from
"fraud, collusion, [or] arbitrariness."'169 Other courts have said that
they would invalidate association action that is "arbitrary" or "capri-
cious" or "unreasonable,"'' 7° or that fails to "meet judicial standards of
fairness and unreasonableness.' ' 71 These tests comprise a balance of
both substantive and procedural considerations. Other shorthand tests
employed at this level are primarily procedural, such as the old "nat-
ural justice" concept 72 and the more modem "rudimentary due
process" formulation.'7 3
Of all these catch phrases, "reasonableness" is most used and
probably the best single descriptor of second level review of pro-
fessional action. The reasonableness standard can be used in varying
degrees with each of the five theories of liability discussed above. 74
167. See, e.g., Robinson v. Stevens, 249 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 939 (1958). See also Chafee, supra note 38, at 1020.
168. 23 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ill.), affd, 99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938).
169. 23 F. Supp. at 699.
170. E.g., Silver v. Castle Memn. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 479-80, 486-87, 497 P.2d
564, 568, 572, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
171. E.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 75 Cal. Rptr. 712,
720 (Ct. App.), vacated on other grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1969).
172. E.g., Milkie v. Academy of Medicine, 18 Ohio App. 2d 44, 246 N.E.2d
598 (1969); see Chafee, supra note 38, at 1015-18.
173. E.g., Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.
1972). See Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 166,
460 P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969). where the court used "fundamentals
of due process," a phrase explained in a later appeal of the same case as "the
minimal requisites of a fair procedure required by established common law
principles." 2 Cal. 3d 541, 545, 526 P.2d 253, 256, 116 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (1974).
174. The reasonableness of the association's interpretation of its rules can
become an issue under the contract theory; the "reasonable person" standard
is basic to the application of many tort theories; the public trust theory permits
inquiry into the reasonableness of association action in light of the association's
own policies and goals. But cf. notes 177-80 infra and accompanying text.
Under antitrust theory, only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal The
state action theories usually lead to application of due process or equal protec-
tion guarantees, the former involving the reasonableness of the procedures by
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Although vague, the reasonableness standard is sufficiently flexible
to facilitate judicial review of professional action by courts willing
to examine reasonableness in that special context 7 5 At the second
level of review, reasonableness is determined in relation to the policies
and objectives of the association,' 7 6 not in relation to some external
standard.
The third and deepest level of judicial review considers the health
professions' role in society and the special problems created by their
exertion of professional power. Level three review cuts to the heart
of these problems: the vital relationship between professional power
and the public interest. The validity of association action at this level
depends on its consonance with the public interest and public policy.
This standard of review can be used to some degree with any of the
five theories of liability discussed above.'7 7 It is particularly com-
patible with the public trust theory, which fortifies the judicial con-
ception of a profession as a public service pursuit'17 and holds the
health professions to their self-proclaimed goal of protecting the
public interest.
7 9
which association decisions are made, and the latter involving the reasonable-
ness of any discriminatory impact of an association decision.
175. When used to measure the procedural validity of association action,
reasonableness is tantamount to a rudimentary due process standard. Requir-
ing that an association's procedures be reasonable is essentially requiring that
they provide at least the minimal protections commonly associated with due
process. In a procedural context, the rudimentary due process concept is more
direct and familiar and is therefore preferable as a standard of review to the
more general term "reasonableness."
176. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of
Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 467-69, 471 (D.D.C. 1969),
rev'd, 432 F.2d 650, 654, 657-58 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
177. For discussion of third level review under the contract theory, see note
166 supra and accompanying text. Some tort theories, particularly that of
prima facie tort, necessitate balancing individual and public interests. See
Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962). For discussion of the public trust theory, see text
accompanying notes 106-17 supra. The antitrust theory is sensitive to the
public interest insofar as antitrust law protects against a "special form of
public injury ...... Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940).
The state action theories, as well as the due process and equal protection
guarantees which they embrace, are constitutional manifestations of public
policy to be implemented consistently with the public interest.
178. See, e.g., In re Estate of Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 311 N.E.2d 480, 483,
355 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339-40 (1974); In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 548, 97 A.2d 621,
631-32 (1953).
179. See Wiggins, Generic Problems in Graduate Medical Education, in THE
MEDICAL STAFF IN THE MODERN HOSPITAL 354 (C.W. Eisele ed. 1967):
There is a certain substance to the profession of medicine which calls
upon the conscience of its members both collectively and individually
to honor the common good of the public it serves. At the core of this
substance and central to medicine's responsibility as a learned profes-
sion is the role of stewardship of a body of knowledge essential to
the public welfare. Our value to society is measured ultimately by
the extent to which we exercise our stewardship to the benefit of the
society which has entrusted it to us.
For a comparable view of accrediting associations' public trust responsibilities,
see Selden, Accreditation and the Public Interest (June, 1976) (an occasional
paper of The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation). See also PENNELL,
PROFFITT & HATCH, supra note 7, at 11:
There has been and should continue to be a valid plurality of interests
connected with each of the health professions. However, the preten-
sions of each group or sub-group need to be tested against fact, reality,
and the larger public interest.
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Like second level review, the third level of review is based largely
on a standard of reasonableness. Unlike level two, however, it meas-
ures reasonableness with reference to public policy rather than to the
association's own policies. For a court using this external standard,
the greatest difficulty is determining the public policy or public
interest inherent in a particular exercise of professional power.180
The search is basically one for prevailing social and political values.
The constitution and statutes of the jurisdiction constitute the major
source of such values. Sometimes a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision will apply directly to a dispute, such as ones brought under the
antitrust and state action theories and occasionally under the tort
theories discussed above. In such instances, public policy is rela-
tively clear. When pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions
do not apply directly, a court may nevertheless extract from them an
expression of public policy. In Falcone, for example, the lower court
found in the state medical licensure laws a public policy that had been
contravened by the local medical society in excluding plaintiff from
membership:
The State of New Jersey has determined that it is in the public
interest that graduates of [a state-approved school] who success-
fully pass the State Board examination be admitted to the prac-
tice of medicine and surgery in this State. The State of New
Jersey is the appropriate authority for the declaration of public
policy in relation to this field, and the same may not lawfully be
exercised by any independent agency.'
8 '
In addition to state constitutions and statutes, prior judicial deci-
sions are important public policy sources. 82 Executive pronounce-
ments, the regulations and policies of administrative agencies, and
other official action evidencing "long governmental practice" in the
jurisdiction also may be bellwethers of public policy. 83 When these
180. See notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text. See generally Harris,
Voluntary Association as a Rational Ideal, in VOLUNTARY AssocIATIONS, supra
note 37, at 53-60.
181. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 62 N.J. Super. 184, 207, 162
A.2d 324, 336-37 (1960); see id. at 186, 162 A.2d at 333-37. Although the New
Jersey Supreme Court's affirmance did not adopt precisely this reasoning, its
opinion reflects a similar view of state public policy. See notes 35, 51, 52,
90 supra and accompanying text. The court later used a comparable argument
in Higgins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 202-04, 238
A.2d 665, 671-72 (1968). For examples of similar judicial reliance on statutes
as sources of public policy in other areas of law, see Frampton v. Central In-
diana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (state workman's compensa-
tion legislation); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90
Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970) (state landlord-tenant statutes); Aweeka v. Bonds, 20
Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971) (remedies provisions of state civil
code); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d 793, 13
Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961) (state labor law code).
182. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931);
see note 4 supra; cf. notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text.
183. See Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945).
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sources are exhausted, public policy may be found in the "general
current" of legislation and judicial opinion.' 84 Other more amor-
phous sources mentioned by some courts include "modern experience
and thought,"'8 5 "history and experience,"' 8 6 and "obvious ethical or
moral standards."'
' 8 7
A search of public policy sources, even at the statute level, is
usually a complex undertaking. A court often will require the testi-
mony of government officials or experts in health or other disciplines
who are trained to identify the predominant needs and demands of
society. 8 8 The farther afield the search extends, the greater the
deference to be accorded the professional association's position,
especially if the dispute involves an association's substantive deter-
mination based on its true expertise. If the search for public policy
fails, level three review also fails for lack of an external standard by
which to gauge the validity of associational action. A reviewing
court should revert then to level two. In the health care field, how-
ever such a result will become less likely as governmental interest
and activity grow'8 9 and as scholarly and professional attention to the
public interest increases. 90
The search for public policy is easier for procedural issues than for
substantive issues. In the procedural realm, the due process guar-
antees of state and federal constitutions may be persuasive guides to
public policy. Under the state action doctrine, the federal constitu-
tion may apply directly to professional action and impose due process
as a requirement of constitutional law, rather than as mere pronounce-
ments of public policy.' 9 ' Under other theories of liability, courts may
find constitutional due process a predominant source of public policy
184. See Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933).
185. Id. at 381.
186. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 98 (1955) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
187. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945); see Rosenthal v.
Harwood, 35 N.Y.2d 469, 323 N.E.2d 179, 363 N.Y.S. 939 (1974) (codes of profes-
sional ethics as a source of public policy). Although elusive, such sources are
clearly among the wellsprings of judge-made law. As Justice Holmes noted
long ago, legal considerations include "the felt necessities of the time, the prev-
alent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious....
.... [E]very important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact
and at bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public
policy." 0. HOLmES, THE COMMON LAw 1, 35 (1881).
188. The litigation in Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), see notes 94, 131,
153 supra and accompanying text, is illustrative of a judicial search for public
policy. The ten-week trial included voluminous testimony by government of-
ficials and experts in education, economics, sociology, and administration. Fed-
eral and state statutes and governmental practices were analyzed for their
public policy content. The policies of other accrediting associations and a wide
sampling of "modern thought and experience" were considered.
189. See notes 225-41 infra and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., R. STEvENS, supra note 6; HOSPITALS, DOCTORS, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (J. Knowles ed. 1965); Cohen, Professional Licensure, Organizational
Behavior, and the Public Interest, 51 MILBANK, AD=. FUND Q. 73 (1973). See
generally notes 1-3, 5, 7-9, 14, 21, 26, 27, 31, 40-42, 64 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 135-66 supra.
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and impose due process restrictions on professional associations by
analogizing the "private governments" of the professions to public
governments.
92
In substantive disputes, no single public policy source is predomi-
nant, and the public interest will vary with the nature of association
action and the social values involved. While the professional associa-
tion's expert view on substantive public policy is important, the court
should avoid merely accepting the association's view because the asso-
ciation's notion of the public interest will necessarily be affected by its
own special interests.19 3 The court, moreover, should remember that
"the public interest is more than the arithmetical sum of the private
interests of the nation."'1 94 The search at level three must be for a
transcendent public interest superior to the private interest of any or
all private groups in the social and political structure.
The depth of a particular court's review can seldom be categorized
neatly into one of the above three levels, partly because insufficient
attention has been accorded to review standards and partly because
courts may simultaneously pursue more than one level of review.
In Falcone, for instance, the court required the defendant medical
society to act "in a reasonable and lawful manner for the advance-
ment of the interest of the medical profession and the public gener-
ally."' 95 In Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 96 the test was whether
the hospital's action was "reasonabl[e] and for the public good."
1 97
The Marjorie Webster litigation 9 8 is illustrative of an intermixture
of review standards. The district court began its analysis under an
antitrust theory by evaluating the reasonableness of the association's
action in relation to the association's stated objectives., 99 It next
undertook an amalgam of public trust and state action analyses, using
a standard of "arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable" at one
point and "arbitrary, unreasonable, and contrary to the public inter-
192. See generally text accompanying notes 5-31 supra. For a discussion
of the analogy between public governments and professional associations see
notes 43-46 supra and accompanying text.
193. See Harris, supra note 180, at 54-56. See also notes 48-50 supra and ac-
companying text.
194. Miller, The Constitution and the Voluntary Association: Some Notes
Toward a Theory, in VOLuNTARY AssocrATIONS, supra note 37, at 252 (para-
phrasing 1962 statement by President John F. Kennedy). See also McConnell,
The Public Values of the Private Association, in VOLUnTARY AssocATONs,
supra note 37, at 159; note 3 supra.
195. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 596, 170 A.2d
791, 799 (1961).
196. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963); see text accompanying notes 53-54
supra.
197. 40 N.J. at 402-03, 192 A.2d at 824.
198. Marjorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
199. 302 F. Supp. at 469.
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est" at another.20 0  The court of appeals restated the public trust
standard as "reasonable, applied with an even hand, and not in con-
flict with the public policy of the jurisdiction, '20 1 but used a reason-
ableness test relating to the association's objectives, rather than the
public interest, because of its doubts concerning the strength of the
association's monopoly power.20 2 The appellate court also relied on
a similar reasonableness standard in its state action-due process
analysis.
20 3
The best attempt thus far at organizing the various review stand-
ards into a workable pattern is probably the opinion in Biende v.
Maricopa County Medical Society.20 4 In reviewing the medical soci-
ety's rejection of the plaintiff physician's membership application, the
court first considered whether the society had complied with its own
procedural rules-a level one inquiry. Next, the court determined that
the society had not acted in bad faith-a level two inquiry. Advanc-
ing to a combined level two and level three approach, the court
observed that the society could reject the application "only on a show-
ing of just cause established by the Society under proceedings em-
bodying the elements of due process. ' 20 5 Under this approach, due
process is the test of procedural validity and "just cause" the test of
substantive validity. "Just cause" embodies a standard of reason-
ableness which, in turn, requires consideration of the public interest:
When determining whether "just cause" has been shown, the court
must consider whether the grounds for exclusion were (1) sup-
ported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably related to legit-
imate professional purposes of the Society. The judicial process
involved in determining such a standard of reasonableness is
essentially one of balancing individual, group and public interests:
the right of the individual to practice his profession without undue
restriction; the right of the public to have unrestricted choice of
physicians; and the justification for the Society's action. When
examining the justification for the exclusion, the court should
consider several factors: the social value of the goal of the Soci-
ety's action; the appropriateness of the Society as a means for
achieving the goal, and the reasonableness of this particular action
of the Society in relation to the goal.
20 6
Utilizing this reasonableness-public interest standard, the court held
that the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action and remanded
the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is a major component of the standards utilized
at the second and third levels of judicial review and deserves exten-
200. Id. at 471, 478.
201. 432 F.2d at 655.
202. Id. at 657-58.
203. Id. at 658-59.
204. 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964).
205. Id. at 243, 393 P.2d at 929-30.
206. Id. at 244, 393 P.2d at 930.
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sive treatment because of its special importance in the developing
law of health professional associations. Procedural due process re-
quirements inhibit arbitrariness and impose order and regularity on
professional decisionnaking processes. They seek to assure both the
integrity of the decisionmaking process and the substantive validity
of the decisions, thus protecting affected parties and the public
against abuses of professional power.
207
Due process is a constitutional concept embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In pro-
fessional association law, however, due process has been increasingly
invoked as a nonconstitutional doctrine which limits professional
power even when an association's action does not constitute state
action.2 08 Although constitutional due process is theoretically more
stringent than the nonconstitutional concept, the two concepts have
substantially the same effect on professional power problems.2 0 9
To determine the requirements that procedural due process places
on professional association decisionmaking, a distinction must be made
between adjudicatory procedures and rulemaking procedures. Rule-
making procedures are used in formulating general standards and
policies; adjudicatory procedures are used in applying those standards
and policies to specific cases. Although adoption of comprehensive
rulemaking procedures may improve the quality of the decisions made
by a health professional association and may increase judicial and
public confidence in its standards, courts have not imposed rulemak-
ing procedures on professional associations. In the adjudicatory con-
text, however, courts have increasingly applied procedural require-
ments to professional association decisions, such as a hospital medical
staff's decision to exclude or expel a particular physician.
207. Due process is substantive as well as procedural, as is the law concern-
ing the scope of review of the activities of professional associations. See text
accompanying notes 163-94 supra. In the context of professional associations,
substantive due process, as either a constitutional or nonconstitutional concept,
subjects an association's substantive standards and policies to general reason-
ableness requirements like those used in level two and three review. See text
accompanying notes 167-90, 206 supra. Courts resort to substantive due
process less frequently, and with greater restraint, than procedural due proc-
ess. See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra. They often do not refer to
it by name even when applying its principles.
208. See notes 96, 172-73, 191-92, 205 supra and accompanying text. Proce-
dural requirements are most likely to be imposed under the contract or public
trust theories, see text accompanying notes 95-97, 106-17 supra, although there
is also precedent under federal antitrust law. See note 132 supra and accom-
panying text. Procedural requirements are occasionally imposed on profes-
sional associations by statute. See Needleman v. Dade County Medical Ass'n,
205 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1967).
209. See Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.
1972). For the purposes of this discussion the requirements of constitutional
and nonconstitutional due process will be considered as being the same. All
cited cases are based on the nonconstitutional approach unless otherwise noted.
1976
The procedures to be imposed on association decisionmaking should
depend on the gravity of the decision to be made and its potential
impact on the affected party, the importance of a particular pro-
cedure in assuring the decision's substantive validity, and the burden
that a particular procedure would place on the association's pursuit
of its organizational objectives.2 10 The likelihood of judicial imposi-
tion increases as the gravity of the decision and the importance of
the procedure increase, and decreases as the procedure's burden on
the association increases. Since the health professional associations'
monopoly power often heightens the gravity of their decisions, 211
courts are likely to require substantial procedural protection in asso-
ciation decisionmaking.
The adjudicative hearing is the core of procedural due process. It
provides the affected party an opportunity to present his case before
adverse action is taken against him. In Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soci-
ety of Orthodontists,12 the California Supreme Court upheld a doctor's
right to a hearing before being rejected for admission to a medical
society. After canvassing the relevant professional association deci-
sions, the court concluded that "[e] very one of the numerous common
law precedents in the area establish that this element [the hearing] is
indispensable to a fair procedure. 2 13
To assure a fair hearing, due process normally guarantees the
affected party the right to appear personally and to present witnesses,
written testimony and documents, and other evidence in his behalf.2 1 4
Often he must be accorded the opportunity to confront and refute the
evidence against him 21 5 Due process does not ordinarily guarantee
the right to counsel to perform these functions, however, unless the
professional association is itself represented by counsel at the hear-
ing.21 6 Imposition of such requirements need not transform associa-
210. For more extended discussion of procedural requirements in particular
areas of professional activity, see Boikess & Winsten, Can PSRO Procedures
Be Both Fair and Workable?, 24 CATH. U.L. Rvv. 407 (1975) (procedures for
PSRO determinations); Braener, Disciplinary Procedures for Trade and Pro-
fessional Associations, 23 Bus. LAw. 959 (1968) (disciplinary decision); Kaplin,
Judicial Review of Accreditation: The Parsons College Case, 40 J. HIGHER ED.,
543, 549-53 (1969) (accreditation); Ludlam, Physician-Hospital Relations: The
Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 879, 888-92 (1970); South-
wick, Legal Aspects of Medical Staff Function, in Eisele, supra note 179, at
75-76 (hospital staff privileges); Comment, Procedural Due Process and the
Separation of Functions in State Occupational Licensing Agencies, 1974 Wisc.
L. REv. 833 (suspension or revocation proceedings of a state licensure agency).
211. See text accompanying notes 76-94 supra.
212. 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1969).
213. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555, 526
P.2d 253, 263, 116 Cal Rptr. 245, 255 (1974). The distinction between expul-
sions and exclusions should be of little relevance in this context. See notes
76-77 supra and accompanying text. But see Don v. Okmulgee Mem. Hosp.,
443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971).
214. E.g., Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555,
526 P.2d 253, 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255 (1974); Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp.,
53 Hawaii 475, 484, 497 P.2d 564, 571 (1972).
215. Virgin v. American College of Surgeons, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d
414 (1963); Reid v. Medical Soc'y of Oneida County, 156 N.Y.S. 780 (1915),
aff'd, 163 N.Y.S. 1129 (1917). Contra, Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii
at 484, 49.7 P.2d at 571.
216. E.g., Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 484-87, 497 P.2d 564,
571-72 (1972).
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tion hearings into "formal proceedings with all the embellishments
of a court rial.. . [or otherwise] fix a rigid procedure... . In-
stead, the associations themselves retain the primary responsibility
for devising... [procedures appropriate to the dispute]. '"217 As
one court recently explained in distinguishing accreditation decisions
from disciplinary decisions:
The nature of the hearing . . .may properly be adjusted to the
nature of the issue to be decided .... Procedures appropriate
to decide whether a specific act of plain misconduct was com-
mitted are not suited to an expert evaluation of education quality.
... Here, no trial-type hearing with confrontation [of ad-
verse witnesses], cross-examination, and assistance of counsel
would have been suited to the resolution of the issues to be
decided. The question was not principally a matter of historical
fact, but rather of the application of a standard of quality in a
field of recognized expertise.218
The opportunity for a hearing would little benefit an affected party
with no adequate opportunity to prepare for it. Due process requires,
therefore, that the party be given advance notice of the "time, place,
and subject of the inquiry, [and] adequate notice of exactly what
conduct was under investigation." 2119 This notice must normally
include a "written statement ... adequate to apprise. . . [the party]
of the specific charges against him"220 and provide a definite and
understandable basis for organizing the defense. The affected party
must also be provided notice of the hearing's format and allowed
sufficient time for defense preparation.
Specification of the contested conduct is of full value to the affected
party only if he has advance notice of the standards for evaluating
the conduct. Although courts seldom address this matter, due process
would normally require an association to have such standards and to
apprise the affected party of which standard he allegedly has not met.
Pre-existing standards are useful not only to the affected party, but
to all potential parties who desire guidance in evaluating their own
professional performance. Professional action that penalizes an
association member or prospective member for noncompliance with
a standard that is either nonexistent or not constructively known to
217. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555, 526
P.2d 253, 263-64, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255-56 (1974); see Sussman v. Overlook
Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389, 393 (1967).
218. Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 65, 72 (N.D. Ill.
1967); cf. Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 484-87, 497 P.2d 564, 571-
72 (1972).
219. Duby v. American College of Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.
1972).
220. Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 484-87, 497 P.2d 564, 571
(1972); see Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 551-
52, 526 P.2d 253, 263-64, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255-56 (1974).
1976]
the party at the time of the alleged noncompliance is inconsistent with
modern notions of due process.
To provide adequate notice, standards should be in writing and
stated with sufficient definiteness to be intelligible. Extensive
definition or technical detail is usually not required. A professional
association is "entitled to make a conscious choice in favor of flexible
standards to accommodate variation in purpose and character among
its constituent institutions [or members], and to avoid forcing all
into a rigid and uniform mold."221 The more deeply the association's
professional expertise is implicated in the formulation and applica-
tion of its standards, the more flexibility will due process ordinarily
permit.
Due process requires that a decision made after a hearing be based
on the record of the proceedings. 222 The decision must be based upon
the charges or deficiencies specified by the association, the associa-
tional standards allegedly violated, and the factual evidence presented
at the hearing. The decisionmakers must be impartial.223 Addition-
ally, due process may sometimes require that the association justify
its decision in a written statement to substantiate that the decision is
based on the record.
224
Conciusion
The activities of health professional associations have received varied
treatment in the courts. The judicial response to problems of pro-
fessional power has been inadequately reasoned and often has failed
to consider the broad social issues these problems raise. The courts
must develop a more comprehensive methodology for reviewing pro-
fessional association activity. They cannot ignore abuses of profes-
sional power in health care, and they must chart a careful course be-
tween competing public policy concerns. Courts must identify more
clearly these public policy concerns and further define the theories of
liability and scope of judicial review in individual cases. They must
221. Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 65, 73 (N.D. Ill.
1967); see Sosa v. Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1971)
(constitutional theory in which the court stated: "[I]n the area of personal
fitness for medical staff privileges, precise standards are difficult if not impos-
sible to articulate. The subjectiveness of selection simply cannot be minutely
codified.").
222. Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 486, 497 P.2d 564, 572
(1972); Davis v. Morristown Mem. Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 43, 254 A.2d 125,
131 (1969). See also Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal.
3d 541, 551, 526 P.2d 253, 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255 (1974).
223. E.g., Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 311-12 (E.D. Pa.
1970); Possner v. Bronx County Medical Soc'y, 19 App. Div. 2d 89, 241 N.Y.S.2d
540, 544-45 (1963) (constitutional theory). Partiality or bias could arise from
the hearing officer's or decisionmaker's prior involvement in prosecution of the
charges, see Possner v. Bronx County Medical Soc'y, supra; Citta v. Delaware
Valley Hosp., supra; cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (constitutional
theory), from their conduct during the proceedings, see Blenko v. Schmeltz,
362 Pa. 365, 371-77, 67 A.2d 99, 102-04 (1949) (patent attorney association),
or from their pecuniary interest in the resolution of the charges, see Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (constitutional theory).
224. Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 486, 497 P.2d 564, 572
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also expand the role of empirical data and expert testimony in resolv-
ing professional power disputes.
Solving problems of professional power is a task for legislatures as
well as the judiciary. To date, however, legislatures have remained
aloof from such problems.225 Only the antitrust theories of liability
are based on statutory texts, and the application of these theories to
the health professions has been accomplished by judicial craftsman-
ship rather than by express legislative command.226 Although many
of the decisions discussed above demonstrate that courts play a role
independent of legislatures in modernizing and developing legal
responses to professional power problems,227 growing public aware-
ness of the vital relationship between professional standard setting
and the public interest may prompt legislatures to increase their
scrutiny of professional associations. 228 State legislatures have exten-
sive authority under the police power to regulate the delivery of
health care and to establish professional standards.22 9 Similarly,
Congress can exert considerable regulatory influence under its spend-
ing and commerce powers.230 Although both state and federal legisla-
tive activity concerning health care is increasing,231 statutes regulating
the standard-setting activities of professional associations are rare.
232
(1972); Davis v. Morristown Mem. Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 43, 254 A.2d 125,
131 (1969).
225. For analyses of influences within the legislative process that have in-
hibited legislative activism, see Gilb, supra note 45, at 196-223; Akers, The Pro-
fessional Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 LAw & Soc. REV.
463, 465-70 (1968).
226. See notes 118-34 supra and accompanying text.
227. See notes 4, 115-17, 180-87, 195-205 supra and accompanying text; cf.
notes 111-13 supra and accompanying text.
228. For a general approach to determining whether legislative intervention
is appropriate, see notes 4, 86 supra and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores,
414 U.S. 156 (1973); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Semler
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935). State courts
relying on state constitutional theories have imposed limitations on this broad
authority. See Group Health Ins. of N.J. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103
(1963); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d
487 (1971). See generally, Snoke and Snoke, The State Role in the Regulation
of the Health Delivery System, 6 TOLEDO L. REV. 617 (1975). For an example
of a federal constitutional limitation, see Berger v. Board of Psychologist Ex-
aminers, 521 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (deprivation of right to practice vio-
lative of fifth amendment due process).
230. See, e.g., Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1974) (estab-
lishment of standards for physical therapists under Medicare); Association
of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd, 423 U.S. 975 (1976) (establishment of Professional Standards Review Or-
ganizations).
231. An example of state legislative activity is the regulation of new cate-
gories of auxiliary health personnel, such as physician assistants. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, supra note 26, Appendix B (1971).
The major federal example is the Professional Standards Review legislation.
See note 10 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of federal legis-
lative activity, see R. STEVENS, supra note 6, at 496-527 (1971).
232. But see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 206-a (McKinney 1971) (prohibition
1976]
Future legislation could set standards under the hospital licensure
laws for the extension and revocation of hospital privileges; 3
impose minimal procedural requirements on professional associations
under state corporation law for the extension and revocation of associ-
ation membership;23 4 clarify or extend the application of federal and
state antitrust laws to professional associations; 235 and devise struc-
tural or procedural conditions to be met by a professional association
before state or federal governments will rely on its decisions.
23 6
Health professional associations should note carefully the current
judicial and prospective legislative trends. Even though these trends
indicate increasing public scrutiny of professional power, they do not
presage an end to professional autonomy or an undermining of pro-
fessional expertise. Rather, they suggest that the deference accorded
autonomy and expertise will be weighed against a broader backdrop
of public interest -considerations.
23 7
The health professional associations must accommodate this in-
creased public concern and assure the courts, the legislatures, and
the general public that professional power is not being abused. Sug-
gested areas for associational reform include developing an empirical
basis for the establishment and validation of professional standards;
238
affording affected outside parties an opportunity to comment on pro-
posed standards; strengthening due process safeguards in decisions
to deny, revoke, or limit professional status or privileges; 23 9 requiring
formal representation of other professions and the public in standard-
setting and enforcing processes;240 and rethinking and justifying
on denial of hospital staff privileges due to participation in group practice);
id. at § 2801-b (requirement that hospitals state reasons for any denial or limi-
tation of staff privileges, and that reasons be related "to standards of patient
care, patient welfare, the objectives of the institution, or the character or com-
petency of the applicant"); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 1406 (McKinney
1970) (right to appeal to state medical society from certain membership deci-
sions of county medical societies); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.10 (1975) (right to
hearing before expulsion from professional association).
233. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 206-a, 2801-b (McKinney 1971). See gen-
erally, Comment, Hospital Staff Privileges-the Need for Legislation, 17 STAN.
L. REv. 900 (1965).
234. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 1406 (McKinney 1970); FLA.
STAT. Alr. § 617.10 (1975).
235. See notes 118-34 supra and accompanying text.
236. See Criteria and Procedures for Recognition of Nationally Recognized
Accrediting Agencies and Associations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 149.1-.24 (1975) (criteria
by which Commissioner of Education recognizes accrediting bodies under fed-
eral aid-to-education programs).
237. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
238. See notes 47-70 supra and accompanying text. See generally Selden,
Research in Accreditation of Health Educational Programs, in SASHEP, supra
note 7, pt. I.
239. See notes 207-24 supra and accompanying text. See generally J. Miller,
supra note 3, at 186-94. If an association's procedures provide affected parties
with remedies, courts will usually require the parties to exhaust those proce-
dures as a prerequisite for judicial review. See note 32 supra and accompany-
ing text. Thus, procedural reform would not only remove a ground on which
courts frequently have invalidated professional decisions, see notes 207-24
supra and accompanying text, but would greatly increase the association's op-
portunity to handle disputes internally, insulated from judicial intervention.
240. See SASHEP, supra note 15, at 23, 27; Selden, Accreditation and the
Public Interest (an occasional paper of The Council on Postsecondary Accredi-
tation, June 1976); cf. Cohen, note 190 supra, at 81-83, 84-85 (public and inter-
professional representation on state licensing boards).
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operational interlocks with other associations and other standard-
setting mechanisms.2 1
Such reforms are not panaceas. Reforms never are. But their
implementation can regenerate public confidence in the health pro-
fessions, better protect the public interest in health care, and decrease
the likelihood of judicial involvement in the affairs of health pro-
fessional associations.
241. See notes 11-31 supra and accompanying text. See also Grimm, supra
note 14, at I-1, 1-22 to 24.
1976]
